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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike prior years in which the Florida Supreme Court was relatively
silent with respect to marital and family law issues, the past two years
brought a virtual torrent of family law opinions from the supreme court,
twelve in all, most of which reaffirmed established legal principles, but
several of which significantly altered the course of marital and family law
in Florida.
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At the appellate level, the past two years brought a series of decisions
reflecting at least four apparent trends,' and six areas of distinct conflict in
the opinions of the various appellate courts.2
II. AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The first trend that developed in the appellate decisions rendered during
the survey period was a clear movement toward very literal and strict
interpretation of the provisions of both antenuptial and postnuptial
(settlement) agreements, such that the relief or remedies available to the
parties entering into such agreements will be limited to what is precisely
provided for by the terms of the agreement. In Genunzio v. Genunzio,3 the
parties entered into an antenuptial agreement pursuant to which they agreed,
in the first paragraph of the agreement, that the property owned by them at
the time of the agreement would remain each person's separate property.
The second paragraph of the agreement required that all property acquired
during the marriage would be titled in a joint tenancy between them, and
said property would be equally divided between them upon dissolution of
I. The four trends which appear in the decisional law are a line of opinions indicating
that antenuptial and postnuptial agreements will be strictly and literally interpreted in accor-
dance with the precise language used by the parties; the development of a factual standard
for the award of permanent alimony; an inclination towards interpretation of the law so as
to provide the maximum ability to enforce alimony and child support awards; and a
tightening of the standards under which a trial court's imputation of income to a spouse in
alimony and child support cases will be affirmed.
2. The six areas of distinct conflict in the opinions of the appellate courts concern the
questions of whether a trial court may extinguish an obligor's temporary support arrearages
by the entry of a final judgment; whether a requirement that a spouse maintain medical
insurance on behalf of the other spouse or minor children must contain a specific dollar
limitation as to the amount of the obligation; whether a child's conduct toward the parent
owing a duty of support on behalf of the child may be so egregious as to warrant a
termination of that parent's support obligation; whether the enhanced value of premarital or
non-marital assets for equitable distribution purposes includes all of the enhanced value
however caused or whether such value includes only that portion of the enhancement directly
attributable to the marital labors or funds devoted thereto, when and under what circum-
stances may a party claim an entitlement to the fair rental value of property occupied
exclusively by a co-tenant former spouse; and whether an income deduction order may be
entered solely to enforce an alimony obligation where the case does not involve minor
children.
3. 598 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
1993]
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their marriage. Following the execution of this agreement, the husband
purchased a home with his separate funds, and titled the home in his sole
name.
At the time of the dissolution of marriage, the trial court determined
that the wife was entitled to a partial interest in the home purchased by the
husband during the marriage. The Second District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the wife was entitled to a fifty percent interest in the
home, and not the partial interest awarded by the trial court.'
In reversing, the district court held that the "plain meaning" of the
antenuptial agreement was just that, and while the wife was to have no
interest in the property of the husband owned at the time of the agreement,
she was entitled to one-half of all property acquired during the marriage.'
The district court based its decision upon a literal reading of the agreement,
noting that the second paragraph of the agreement did not exclude from its
operation property acquired by either party after the agreement with property
owned at the time of the agreement, nor did the provisions of the agreement
in this regard distinguish between property acquired with non-marital or
marital funds.6 The sole criterion for the operation of the paragraph was
whether property was acquired during the marriage. The court expressed no
hesitancy or reluctance in so interpreting the agreement. The court reasoned
that, "[i]f the husband's apparent decision not to except from paragraph 2
property purchased with nonmarital funds was unwise in hindsight, that is
not something from which a court of law is entitled to protect him. We
must construe the contract in accordance with its plain meaning."7
Following the decision in Genunzio, the Second District rendered its
decision in Osborne v. Osborne,8 again limiting the parties to an antenuptial
agreement to the strict language of their agreement. In Osborne, the
husband and wife married when they were both nineteen years of age. Less
than two years after they married, the parties divorced, and pursuant to their
settlement at the time, the wife received one-half of the equity in the home
($1,012.50), her car, and the household furniture. She received no alimony
or other form of support although the husband did agree to pay her
attorney's fees of $150. Several years later, the parties decided to remarry
but the husband, upset about how he had been "taken to the cleaners" in
4. Id. at 130.
5. Id. at 131.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 604 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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their earlier divorce, demanded that the wife execute an antenuptial
agreement. The wife did so.
The antenuptial agreement entered into by the parties provided that the
wife would waive all of her rights to any property solely owned by the
husband. With respect to alimony, the agreement provided that any alimony
to be paid by the husband would be rehabilitative in nature, and would not
exceed the sum of $1000 multiplied by the number of years of the marriage.
The full amount of such alimony, as calculated under the formula set forth
in the agreement, was to be paid to the wife in a lump sum provided that
the husband possessed the ability to pay the amount in a lump sum payment.
The determination of the husband's ability to pay was to be made solely by
the husband, and the agreement provided that his decision as to his own
ability to pay was to be "controlling and final."9 The agreement further
provided that if the husband decided that he lacked the ability to pay the
lump sum, then the alimony would be paid to the wife at the rate of $83.33
per month "for so long a period of time as the parties shall have been
married at the time their marriage is dissolved."'
Fifteen years after the execution of the antenuptial agreement, the
parties divorced. The husband sought to restrict the wife's alimony award
to the formula provided in the antenuptial agreement, but the trial court
determined that, despite the detailed language of the agreement regarding the
manner in which tile wife's alimony entitlement was to be calculated, the
agreement did not contain any type of waiver of the wife's right to seek
modification of the amount of alimony provided for in the agreement, nor
did the agreement contain a waiver of the wife's right to seek permanent
alimony. As such, the trial court, noting that a substantial change in the
circumstances of the parties occurred following the execution of the
antenuptial agreement, awarded the wife substantially more alimony than the
$83.33 per month as provided in the agreement. Additionally, the court
awarded the wife permanent alimony. Moreover, the trial court awarded the
wife the parties' former marital home which had been owned solely by the
husband."'
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the award of the home
to the wife, finding that the parties' antenuptial agreement clearly specified
that the wife had waived any claim to the husband's solely owned
property.' 2 However, the district court affirmed the trial court's alimony
9. Id. at 859.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 860.
12. Id.
1993]
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awards, upholding the authority of the trial court to grant relief not
specifically waived by the provisions of an antenuptial agreement. 3
Similarly, in Ryland v. Ryland,4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that the parties to an antenuptial agreement were bound by the
express language of their agreement, but where the agreement did not
specifically address a particular issue or waive a particular right, the trial
court was free to act within the bounds of its discretion as to that issue or
right.' 5 The parties in Ryland had entered into a "homemade" antenuptial
agreement which provided only that the wife waived any claims to the
husband's premarital property and if the parties divorced, the husband had
the right of first refusal to purchase the wife's interest in their home. In
their subsequent divorce case, the trial court awarded the wife lump sum
alimony, to be paid from the husband's separate assets, and attorney's fees.
The district court reversed in part and affirmed in part, finding that the trial
court had the authority to award both alimony and attorney's fees to the
wife because the antenuptial agreement neither mentioned nor waived the
wife's right to seek such relief.'6 The court opined that the specific
language of the antenuptial agreement only precluded the wife from making
a claim against the husband's separate assets.' 7 Therefore, the trial court
was empowered to award the wife the relief she sought, provided that the
court did not award relief to the wife specifically from the husband's
separate assets.'
8
The foregoing trend continued to develop in the decisional law
rendered during the first half of 1993. For example, in White v. White,'9
the trial court denied alimony to the wife on the basis that she had waived
her claim to alimony in an antenuptial agreement. The Second District
reversed, finding that nowhere in the agreement did the parties use the word
"alimony," and also, that the agreement lacked any express waiver of the
wife's right to seek future support.2"
Similarly, in Timble v. Timble,2" the parties agreed in an antenuptial
13. Osborne, 604 So. 2d at 860.
14. 605 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
15. Id. at 140-41.
16. Id. at 140.
17. Id.
18. Id.; In Porter v. Porter, 593 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), the
Fourth District reversed the trial court's award to the wife finding that the award "deviated
from [the terms of the parties'] contract."
19. 617 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
20. Id. at 734.
21. 616 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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agreement that the husband would have "full rights, liberty [and] authority
• . . to use, enjoy, . . . convey, bequeath, mortgage, grant, sell, invest,
reinvest, alienate and dispose of . . every part of any stock or other
interest, or security he owns directly or indirectly, or may hereafter acquire"
in a certain corporation.22 The wife, at the time of the dissolution of
marriage, sought an award of the enhanced value of the husband's stock
holdings, and the district court determined that the wife had clearly waived
her right to an interest of any kind in the husband's stock holdings by the
clear language of the agreement.23
B. Postnuptial (Settlement) Agreements
The same trend towards strict and literal interpretation of agreements
is found in the appellate decisions pertaining to postnuptial or settlement
agreements, including one decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court.
In Pinrn v. Pimm,24 the supreme court was called upon to answer a
question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal, specifically:
[l]s the postjudgment retirement of a spouse who is obligated to make
support or alimony payments pursuant to a judgment of dissolution of
marriage a change of circumstance that may be considered together with
other relevant factors and applicable law upon a petition to modify such
alimony or support payments? 25
The parties in Pimm had entered into a settlement agreement which did
not address the subject of the husband's possible or potential retirement.
Rather, the agreement required the husband to make alimony payments to
the wife until such time as either party died or the wife remarried. When
the husband retired, many years after the execution of the agreement, he
sought to reduce the amount of his alimony payments to the wife based
upon a decrease in his income. The wife contended that the silence of the
agreement upon the subject of retirement, coupled with the requirement that
the alimony payments continue as long as she was unmarried, indicated that
the husband had agreed to pay alimony regardless of his retirement. The
supreme court disagreed, finding that although "it would be a better practice
to incorporate consideration of retirement and what will happen in the event
of retirement in an agreement," the silence of an agreement on the subject
22. Id. at 1189.
23. Id.
24. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
25. Id. at 535.
1993]
7
Greene: Family Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
will not preclude a trial court from considering a party's retirement as part
of the total circumstances in determining if sufficient changes in circum-
stances exist to warrant a modification.26
The silence of a settlement agreement as to a particular issue was also
addressed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Reynolds v. Dia-
mnond. 7 In Reynolds, the parties had entered into a settlement agreement
pursuant to which the husband agreed to provide for the "costs of education"
with respect to college, postgraduate and professional training for the
parties' two children. To be sure, twelve years after the execution of the
agreement, the parties were before the trial court upon the issue of the
meaning of the words "costs of education," with the wife contending that
the term included all expenses associated with higher education and the
husband arguing that the term meant only tuition and related expenses.2 8
At the appellate level, the husband argued that had he intended to agree
to pay for every expense attendant to a college education, such intent would
have been set forth in the agreement. The district court, however,
determined that the converse was true, reasoning that had the husband
wished to limit his contribution, "such language could have been included
[in the agreement] to make that intention clear." 9
The First District also so held in its 1993 decision of Maclaren v.
Maclaren.3" Therein, the husband sought to terminate his permanent
alimony obligation to the wife based upon his allegation that the wife had
relocated to New Zealand and was living with a man who was substantially
contributing to her support. The trial court denied the modification on the
basis that the parties' agreement did not mention cohabitation, and that such
silence could be interpreted as precluding a reduction or termination of
alimony upon such grounds. The First District refused to interpret the
silence of the agreement as a waiver of relief, and remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the merits of the husband's claims.3'
The Second District, in line with its decisions regarding antenuptial
agreements, also determined, with respect to postnuptial agreements, that the
clear and specific language used by the parties in a postnuptial agreement
will be binding upon the parties. In Agliano v. Agliano,32 the parties were
26. Id. at 537.
27. 605 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
28. Id. at 525-26.
29. Id. at 527.
30. 616 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
31. Id. at 105-06.
32. 605 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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divorced after twenty-seven years of marriage, and entered into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which the husband agreed to pay the wife rehabilita-
tive alimony for a period of fifteen years. The parties agreed that they both
irrevocably waived any right to modify the alimony provisions of their
agreement. After the divorce, the wife was diagnosed with incurable cancer.
She sought a modification of the alimony provisions of the settlement
agreement and contended that her agreement to accept rehabilitative alimony
was impliedly conditioned upon her capacity to achieve a self-supporting
status, which, because of her illness, was ho longer possible.33 Although
the trial court found that there was no question that the wife's illness had
"exacted a financial toll not anticipated or foreseen at the time of the
divorce," the court nevertheless dismissed the wife's request for modifica-
tion. The Second District affirmed the dismissal, finding that the parties'
agreement, "in unmistakable terms," defined the boundaries of the parties'
financial relationship, and those "boundaries" included a complete waiver
of either party's right to seek modification.34 The court noted that there was
"no indication in the agreement" that any event would "devitalize?' the
mutual waivers of the right to modify the terms of the agreement, and, in
very strong terms, held that the wife's illness, "however unanticipated,
however unfortunate, does not detract from the unqualified terms of [the]
agreement."3
All of the foregoing decisions, when read together, appear to indicate
a clear trend at the appellate level, with respect to the interpretation of
antenuptial and postnuptial agreements that: (1) if the parties intend to place
any limitations upon their rights or remedies, they must clearly state so; (2)
mere silence in an agreement as to a particular issue will not be interpreted
as a limitation or a waiver; and (3) if the parties specifically waive a right
or remedy in an antenuptial or settlement agreement, that waiver will be
upheld irrespective of the circumstances or conditions which may later
occur.
III. ALIMONY
A. Permanent Alimony
The single most significant development in the case law rendered
33. Id. at 598.
34. Id.
35. Id.
1993]
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during the past two years was the attempt made by several of the district
courts of appeal to define the factual circumstances under which an award
of permanent alimony is appropriate. In fact, decisions on this subject may
have yielded a new "test" to be applied to determine whether permanent
alimony should be awarded in a given case. Although a total of eight
decisions were rendered addressing this issue during the survey period,
nearly all of the decisions trace their antecedent to Geddes v. Geddes,36 a
1988 opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
In Geddes, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of
alimony to the wife finding "no genuine inequities . . .created by [the]
dissolution" of marriage without permanent alimony.3" In so finding, the
Geddes court commented upon the fact that no minor children were born of
the marriage, and that "no skills were lost" by the wife as a result of the
marriage.3" This latter point subsequently became the standard for the
award of permanent alimony in cases decided between 1991 and the present.
In Spencer v. Spencer,39 decided in December of 1991, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed a rehabilitative alimony award following
a four year marriage, finding that the evidence presented at the trial level
did not establish "that the wife is without the means of self-support, as a
result of anything that has transpired during the marriage."4
Shortly thereafter, in LaHuis v. LaHuis,4' the Third District Court of
Appeal, addressing the denial of rehabilitative alimony, affirmed the trial
court's holding, noting that the wife's "earning potential after the marriage
was not diminished.,
42
Then, in early 1992, the Second District Court of Appeal rendered its
decision in Kremer v. Kremer,43 and reversed the trial court's award of
permanent alimony to a thirty-seven year old wife following a six year
marriage. 4 In reversing, the Second District, citing Geddes and Spencer,
opined that there was no showing that the wife was without the means of
self-support "as a result of anything that [had] transpired during the
marriage.' 45 The court noted that although the parties' respective incomes
36. 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
37. Id. at 1018.
38. Id.
39. 590 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
40. Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
41. 590 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
42. Id. at 558.
43. 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
44. Id. at 218.
45. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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were disparate, that disparity did not result "in any substantial wayfrom the
marriage," because the parties' earnings levels were disparate before they
married.46
Thereafter, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Wright v. Wright,41
reversed the trial court's permanent alimony award to a thirty-nine year old
wife following a five year marriage. The court held, as in the prior
decisions, that the evidence did not establish that the wife was unable to
provide for her own support "as a result of anything that transpired during
the marriage."4
Then, in Gregoire v. Gregoire,49 the Second District Court of Appeal
attempted to explain the meaning of the term "transpired during the
marriage" by comparing the factual circumstances therein to the factual
circumstances of Kremer. ° According to the court, three specific factual
circumstances distinguished the two cases and permitted the award of
permanent alimony in Gregoire: (1) the parties had two minor children for
whom the wife was responsible; (2) the parties had specifically agreed that
the wife would stop working, permanently terminating her career, to become
a full-time homemaker; and (3) the achievement by the husband of his
substantial income producing ability was shown to have been directly
attributable to the wife having financially supported the family while the
husband's income was relatively minimal and he was beginning his
employment." Thus, the wife's inability to provide for her own support
and the disparity between the parties' earnings level were both the result of
events and circumstances that transpired during the marriage.
In 1993, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided the case of
Cornell v. Smith.5 2 Tracing its decision therein back to Geddes, the court
opined that "the courts of this state have consistently held that mere
disparity in incomes is not sufficient to justify an award of permanent
alimony where the wife is relatively young and her earning capacity has not
been impaired as a result of the marriage. '5 3
Then, following a rendition of all of the above decisions of the various
appellate courts, the Fifth District Court of Appeal determined, en banc, the
46. Id. at 215.
47. 613 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
48. Id. at 1333 (emphasis added).
49. 615 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
50. Id. at 694-95.
51. Id. at 695.
52. 616 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
1993]
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case of Kennedy v. Kennedy,54 in which it reversed the trial court's perma-
nent alimony award and adopted what it termed the "doctrine of comparable
fairness."55  In Kennedy, the Fifth District determined that "comparable
fairness" can only be achieved if the trial courts specifically state the factors
upon which they base alimony awards and the weight given to those factors,
so that the appellate courts can ensure that similar results are obtained in
similar cases.56 In other words, the propriety and type of alimony award
(permanent versus rehabilitative) should be decided by comparison with the
specific facts of other cases in which alimony was either awarded or
denied.57
B. Rehabilitative Alimony
With respect to rehabilitative alimony, the cases yielded a series of
decisions from every district court of appeal which reiterated certain well-
established principles, the two most common being: (1) rehabilitative
alimony is not appropriate where the recipient demonstrates no need for new
training or new skills; and (2) rehabilitative alimony must not be awarded
in the absence of an evidentiary showing that the recipient has some ability
to become self-supporting following training or education.
In the first line of decisions, the appellate courts consistently reversed
rehabilitative alimony awards in cases in which the recipient did not
demonstrate an entitlement to any type of alimony in an attempt to reverse
a tendency on the part of trial judges to use rehabilitative alimony awards
as a means of providing the wife with "something" following a dissolution
of marriage.
In Spencer v. Spencer,58 the wife was unemployed and was receiving
welfare benefits at the time of the parties' marriage. When the parties
54. 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
55. Id. at 1033.
56. Id.
57. In reality, the doctrine of "comparable fairness" appears to describe that which the
appellate courts have been doing for quite some time. For example, in Gregoire, the Second
District went to great lengths to explain the difference between the facts therein (in which
the trial court's award of permanent alimony was affirmed), and the facts in Kremer (in
which the trial court's award of permanent alimony was reversed). See Gregoire, 615 So.
2d at 694-95. The significance of the Kennedy case is the Fifth District's insistence upon
specific findings of fact as to the factors considered and the weight given those factors so that
the same set of factors or weighing of factors will lead to the same or similar results in all
cases. See Kennedy, 622 So. 2d at 1033.
58. 590 So. 2d at 553.
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divorced four years later, the wife was employed on a full-time basis, yet
the trial court awarded the wife "rehabilitative alimony." The First District
Court of Appeal reversed the award, finding that the record failed to
demonstrate any need on the part of the wife for the "redevelopment" of
skills or for "training necessary to develop potential supportive skills."59
In Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano,6" the Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant rehabilitative alimony following a
short-term marriage to a wife who was a medical doctor in Peru but not
licensed in the United States, and who voluntarily elected not to seek
employment in this country.6' The district court affirmed the denial of
alimony because the wife was found to have had a number of "marketable
ski Ils. ' 62
In Mahaffey v. Mahaffey,63 the trial court's rehabilitative alimony
award was reversed where the evidence established that the wife was a fully
employed college graduate who was earning more at the time of the
dissolution of marriage than she had earned during the marriage.64
Because the wife did not indicate the need or the intent to further her
education or training, the rehabilitative alimony award was erroneous. 65
In the second line of cases, the district courts attempted to correct
another apparent tendency on the part of the trial courts to award rehabilita-
tive alimony in circumstances where the more appropriate award would have
been permanent alimony. The district courts have had to remind the trial
courts that rehabilitative alimony is to be awarded only in cases where the
evidence establishes that the recipient will be able to become self-supporting
in the standard enjoyed during the marriage as a result of the use of the
award to obtain job skills or training.
In Lanier v. Lanier,66 the First District Court of Appeal reversed a
rehabilitative alimony award to a forty-seven year old wife who had been
married for twenty-five years, and was seeking to become employed as a
teacher who would then earn approximately $20,000 per year. 67 Noting
that the husband earned $50,000 per year, the district court opined that the
59. Id. at 554.
60. 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
61. Id. at 718.
62. Id.
63. 614 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
64. Id. at 650.
65. Id.
66. 594 So. 2d 809 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
67. Id. at 810.
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wife's potential teacher's salary would never permit her to "support herself
at a standard of living commensurate with that established during the
marriage," and, therefore, the award of rehabilitative alimony instead of
permanent alimony was erroneous.68
In Grant v. Grant,69 the First District again reversed a rehabilitative
alimony award where the trial record revealed "neither any previous skills
the [wife] could redevelop nor the potential for developing new supportive
skills."7 Finding that the evidence did not show any ability on the part of
the wife to become self-supporting, "or any substantial capacity for
rehabilitation," the court remanded the case for the entry of an award of
permanent alimony.7
In Bible v. Bible,72 the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to a wife following a twenty-
five year marriage, where, despite evidence of the wife's employment as a
receptionist, the evidence also established that her earnings would never
approach the husband's earnings level.73
Similarly, in Adams v. Adams,74 a rehabilitative alimony award
following a twenty year marriage was reversed upon the basis that the wife's
potential earnings as a teacher would not provide her a level of self-support
commensurate with the standard of living established during the marriage,
and permanent periodic alimony was awarded in its place.7"
In Steinberg v. Steinberg,76 the trial court awarded rehabilitative
alimony for a period of one year to a wife suffering from severe emotional
problems who had been unemployed for over eight years. In reversing this
award, the district court opined that "[o]nly if the wife is capable of
establishing a standard of living commensurate with the standard set
throughout the marriage . . . is an award of rehabilitative alimony prop-
er."
77
68. Id. at 811.
69. 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
70. Id. at 68.
71. Id. at 68-69.
72. 597 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
73. Id. at 361.
74. 604 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 614 So. 2d 502 (Fla.
1993).
75. Id. at 496.
76. 614 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, _ So. 2d _ (Fla.
1993).
77. Id. at 1129.
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C. Temporary Alimony
An interesting development in the decisional law arose in 1992 with
respect to whether a trial court may extinguish, in a final judgment,
temporary alimony arrearages which accrued prior to the entry of the final
judgment. Although two cases decided in 1992 held that the trial court may
not do so," a third case held otherwise."
In Grant v. Grant,8" the husband owed the wife substantial sums of
money pursuant to the trial court's temporary support order. However, the
trial court's final judgment relieved the husband of the arrearages. The First
District Court of Appeal reversed, determining that an "unchallenged"
temporary support order carries with it the presumption of an ability to
comply with the order on the part of the payor. Inasmuch as the husband
had never moved for modification of the terms of the temporary order, the
district court held that the trial court erred in relieving the husband of his
obligation to pay the accrued arrearages."
Similarly, in Burdick v. Burdick,2 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court erred in discharging, through the entry of a final
judgment, the arrearages accrued pursuant to an agreed temporary support
order prior to the entry of the final judgment. 3 In Burdick, the husband
had requested a modification of his temporary obligation and the trial court
had granted the modification. The district court found no error in the trial
court's granting of the requested modification, but held that the trial court
erred in entering a final judgment which "effectively discharged" the
arrearages that had accrued prior to the filing of the modification re-
84quest.
However, after deciding Burdick, the Fourth District decided the case
of Allison v. Allison.85 Therein, at the time of the entry of the final
judgment, the husband owed the wife the sum of $7,500 pursuant to the
terms of a temporary support order. The trial court, in the final judgment,
reduced the amount of the arrearages to $3,500. The district court affirmed,
78. See Grant, 603 So. 2d at 68; Burdick v. Burdick, 601 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
79. See Allison v. Allison, 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
80. 603 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
81. Id. at 69.
82. 601 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. Id. at 634.
84. Id.
85. 605 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618 So. 2d 208 (Fla.
1993).
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finding that a trial court "can modify a temporary alimony award before
final judgment is entered."86
Unfortunately, the Allison case recites few facts. The opinion does not
indicate whether the husband had requested a modification of his temporary
support obligation or whether the trial court modified the husband's
obligation upon its own findings from the evidence presented at the final
hearing. Furthermore, the opinion does not indicate if, in fact, there was a
request for modification by the husband, and whether such a request was
made by written motion or by oral request at the time of the final hearing.
Thus, from the language of the Allison opinion, it appears that the decision
may conflict with both Grant and Burdick to the extent that the latter cases
require that some type of request for a reduction in temporary support be
made in order to authorize the trial court to reduce or eliminate temporary
support arrearages in a final judgment.
D. Lump Sum Alimony
Although it is now established law that lump sum alimony may be
awarded either for the purpose of equalizing a distribution of marital assets
and liabilities, or as a means of providing support to the recipient spouse,
one decision rendered in 1992 makes it clear that such purposes are the only
two purposes for which such alimony may be awarded. s7
In Harvey v. Harvey,88 the trial court attempted to resolve a recurring
problem which may, in fact, have no resolution, at least under the present
status of our law. Therein, the wife contributed immeasurably to the
husband's career, enabling the husband to find and obtain employment that
had the potential to double his salary over that which he had earned during
the years in which the parties were married. The trial court, believing that
the wife was entitled to be recompensed in some manner for her efforts on
behalf of the husband (which would now benefit only the husband), awarded
her the sum of $60,000 as lump sum alimony.89 The district court
reversed, holding that the Florida courts recognize only two types of lump
sum alimony: (1) that relating to support and requiring a showing of need
86. Id. at 131.
87. But cf Handsel v. Handsel, 614 So. 2d 631, 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(affirming an award of lump sum alimony made for the purpose of partially compensating
the wife "for the overwhelming medical expenses incurred and anticipated because of the
husband's egregious behavior."). Such an award, of course, can be viewed as serving a
support purpose.
88. 596 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
89. Id. at 1252.
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and ability to pay; and (2) that pertaining to an equitable division of the
parties' marital assets and liabilities.9" Because the lump sum alimony
award in this case did not pertain to either recognized type of lump sum
alimony, it was reversed. 9
E. Enforcement
In what appears to be another emerging trend in Florida law, the
appellate courts, as a group, rendered a series of 1992 decisions liberally
interpreting existing law in a manner calculated to provide maximum
assistance to parties seeking to enforce alimony and child support awards.
With respect to alimony awards, the First District held that pre-judg-
ment interest must be awarded on amounts due for alimony and child
support arrearages;92 the Second and Fifth Districts held that the statute of
limitations does not apply to proceedings to enforce alimony or child
support orders;93 the Third District held that an equitable lien for the
purpose of' enforcing an alimony award could be applied to homestead
property; 94 and the Fourth District held that an income deduction order may
be entered solely to enforce an alimony award, even in the absence of minor
children, 95 and that an incarcerated husband's assets may be sequestered to
secure alimony and child support awards. 96
In Romans v. Romans,97 the trial court refused to award pre-judgment
interest with respect to the alimony and child support arrearages which the
wife was attempting to collect. The First District simply held that the wife
was "entitled" to such interest as a matter of law.9"
In Frazier v. Frazier,99 the wife filed a petition for registration of the
parties' twenty-seven year old Colorado divorce decree. The district court
held that the husband's statute of limitations defense was inapplicable
90. Id.
91. id.
92. See Romans v. Romans, 611 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
93. See Frazier v. Frazier, 616 So. 2d 575, 579 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Popper
v. Popper, 595 So. 2d 100, 103 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla.
1992).
94. See Radin v. Radin, 593 So. 2d 1231, 1231-32 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 605 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1992).
95. See Coleman v. Coleman, 614 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), approved,
18 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1993).
96. See Held v. Held, 617 So. 2d 358, 360 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
97. 611 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
98. Id. at 93.
99. 616 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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because proceedings to enforce alimony and child support orders are
equitable in nature, and therefore, not barred by a statute of limitations in
Florida.00
Similarly, in Popper v. Popper,'0' the wife sought to enforce and
collect alimony due her from 1972. The husband's alimony obligation was
based upon the provisions of a settlement agreement which was incorporated
into a final judgment several years after its execution. The husband
defended on the basis that the wife's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. The Fifth District held that the wife's claims stemming from the
agreement were, in fact, barred by the statute of limitations, but the claims
arising after the incorporation of the agreement into a judgment were not so
barred. 112 The court opined that the enforcement of periodic alimony and
child support orders are equitable proceedings in nature, and such obliga-
tions are not barred by the running of the statute of limitations.0 3
In Radin v. Radin,'°4 the trial court, in order to enforce its earlier
alimony award which had been unpaid by the husband, imposed an equitable
lien against the husband's post-judgment separate property, which the
husband was in the process of selling. The trial court specifically found that
the husband had engaged in a "pattern of egregious conduct" represented by
significant nonpayment of alimony for a period of nearly ten years.
Although the district court reversed the trial court's order because the
amount of the lien could not be determined from the face of the judgment,
the court upheld the authority of the trial court to impose an equitable lien
upon homestead property in order to enforce an alimony award." 5
In Coleman v. Coleman,10 6 the parties were divorced in 1964, at
which time the husband was ordered to pay alimony. He did so until 1989,
when he sought a modification which was ultimately denied. Eventually,
the trial court entered a judgment against the husband, and then entered an
income deduction order. The husband appealed, contending that an income
deduction order is not proper when no minor children reside with the wife
receiving alimony. The Fourth District held otherwise, opining that the
"unmistakable language" of section 61.1301 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, is
100. Id. The district court, however, noted that the husband could still raise the affirma-
tive defense of laches. Id.
101. 595 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
102. Id. at 103.
103. Id.
104. 593 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id at 1232-33.
106. 614 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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that the enforcement of any alimony obligation requires an income
deduction order." 7 In so holding, however, the Fourth District recognized
conflict with the Second District's opinion in Schorb v. Schorb.' °8 This
conflict was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court, which approved the
Fourth District's holding in Coleman. °9
F. Security/Insurance"°
The single clearest area of conflict between the various appellate courts
in Florida deals with whether a trial court must specify a dollar amount
limitation upon the financial exposure of a spouse who has been required to
maintain medical insurance on behalf of the other spouse, or to pay for the
costs of uncovered medical expenses incurred by the other spouse. The
decisions addressing this question appear to routinely confuse and overlap
the two issues-maintaining medical insurance as distinct from providing for
uncovered medical expenses-and the various districts are clearly in conflict.
With respect to medical insurance, the First District Court of Appeal
has held, in Ginsburg v. Ginsburg,"' that "it is error for the court to
require the husband [to] secure medical coverage [for the wife] without
setting an amount or limitation on that obligation."' 2
In the Second District, in Kremer v. Kremer,"3 the district court
reversed the trial court's order that the husband maintain medical insurance
on behalf of his former wife for a period of three years, and held that the
trial court was required to place "reasonable limitations on the maximum
costs to the husband" regarding the insurance requirement." t4
107. Id. at 533.
108. 547 So. 2d 985 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
109. Coleman v. Coleman, 18 Fla. L. Weekly S546 (Fla. Oct. 21, 1993) (applying the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction in finding that section 61.1301(1)(a) was not
ambiguous, and that it was unnecessary, therefore, to look to legislative intent).
110. The following discussion addresses only the requirement that a party provide either
medical insurance or the costs of medical expenses with respect to the other party as a form
of alimony and not awards made as a form of child support.
111. 610 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
112. Id. at 656-57.
113. 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
114. Id. at 218. The Second District has consistently so held. For example, in Burgess
v. Burgess, 576 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), the court held that "the amount
of money the husband should pay for . . . health insurance [for the wife] be limited to the
amount the husband currently pays to maintain health insurance coverage for his spouse under
his present insurance policy." Id. at 1348.
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In the Fourth District, the waters become quite muddy. Three medical
expense and medical insurance cases were decided by the Fourth District in
1992: one dealing solely with a requirement that insurance be main-
tained," 5 and two dealing with both a requirement that insurance be
maintained and that the payor provide for uncovered medical expenses."
16
In Blythe v. Blythe,"7 the trial court had ordered the husband to
maintain medical insurance on the wife's behalf, of a type and an amount
equal to the insurance that had been provided during the intact marriage by
the husband's employer. On appeal, the husband contended that the order
was erroneous because the trial court had failed to set a monetary limit on
the cost of the health insurance. The Fourth District disagreed, finding that
the trial courts are not required to limit a payor's responsibility to "a
specific dollar amount."
'
"
18
Thereafter, in Watford v. Watford,"9 where the trial court had
ordered a husband to provide for both medical insurance and uncovered
medical expenses, the Fourth District again held that no specific dollar
limitation was required, and that a limitation "of reasonable and necessary
medical expenses [is] an adequate limitation" as either party could apply for
relief from such expenses should the circumstances require it.'2°
However, in Loss v. Loss,'' a different panel of the Fourth District
held contrary to both Blythe and Watford, finding that a limitation to
"reasonable and necessary" was not sufficient, at least with respect to a
requirement that a spouse pay for the medical expenses of the other.' 2
In Loss, the trial court had ordered the husband to maintain medical
insurance on behalf of the wife and minor children, and to provide for the
costs of any uncovered medical expenses. The Fourth District reversed the
award, initially holding that earlier opinions of the Fourth District had
established a requirement that a payor providing for medical expenses must,
"at a minimum," be limited to those expenses which are "reasonable and
necessary."'23 However, the court then went further and opined that even
if the trial court had imposed a "reasonable and necessary" restriction upon
115. See Blythe v. Blythe, 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
116. See Loss v. Loss, 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Watford v.
Watford, 605 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
117. 592 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 355.
119. 605 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
120. Id. at 1315.
121. 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id.
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the husband's obligation to provide for medical expenses, "it would still be
error" because "[s]uch an open-ended and unlimited financial liability is
unenforceable."'
2 4
In Young v. Young,'25 the Fifth District reversed the trial court's
requirement that a husband maintain medical insurance on behalf of the
former wife, finding that the obligation "should have been limited to a
specific sum commensurate with his current level of premium expense.,
126
With respect to medical expenses, as opposed to medical insurance, the
First District held in Payne v. Payne, 7 in accordance with their opinions
dealing with medical insurance costs, that "open-ended" awards of medical
expenses are error and must be reversed. 22 The requirement therein that
the husband pay "all reasonable and customary medical, hospital and dental
bills" was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court "to determine
the husband's maximum liability" for such expenses." 9
In the Second District, there are no opinions on the subject of medical
expenses during the survey period. The court's 1991 decision in Gay v.
Gay 30 applied the Second District's rule that the payor's exposure be
limited to a specific amount to both orders pertaining to medical insurance
and to orders pertaining to the payment of medical expenses.'
As the foregoing demonstrates, there is a clear conflict of opinion
between the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal with respect to whether the trial court must
provide a specific dollar limitation when one spouse is required to provide
medical insurance coverage on behalf of the other spouse. There is a
possible further conflict between the First and Second Districts and the
124. Id. at 42-43.
125. 600 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 13 (Fla.
1992).
126. Id. The Fifth District has also consistently so held. In Szemborski v. Szemborski,
530 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), the court opined that although a trial court has
the power to order one party to obtain insurance coverage on behalf of the other, the
requirement must be "reasonable in amount." Id. at 361. Thereafter, in Marsh v. Marsh, 553
So. 2d 366 (Fla: 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), the language in Szemborski was interpreted to
require the trial court to set a specific amount of the husband's obligation. The court held
that the trial court's failure to "set a monetary limit on the costs of the ordered health
insurance" was reversible error. Id. at 367 n.2.
127. 617 So. 2d 748 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
128. Id. at 749.
129. Id. at 748-49.
130. 573 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
131. Id.
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Fourth District, as to whether a dollar limitation is required with respect to
orders requiring one spouse to provide for the medical expenses of the other
spouse. The Fifth District has required such a limitation with respect to
medical insurance but has not, as yet, addressed the question of the cost of
medical expenses. The Third District has not addressed either issue as of
this date.
G. Imputed Income.32
Following several years in which appellate decisions affirming the trial
court's imputation of income to a spouse were legion, the past two years
have brought a series of decisions restricting the circumstances under which
imputation of income will be deemed appropriate and requiring compliance
with strict standards for such imputation of income. For example, in
Wendroff v. Wendroff,"' the trial court imputed income to the husband
apparently based on a calculation of the amount of deposits made into his
checking account over a seventeen month period. The district court
reversed, however, holding that the trial court erred in imputing income
without setting forth the amounts imputed and the sources of the alleged
imputed income."4
The Second District Court of Appeal rendered four "imputed income"
decisions during the survey period which reversed the trial court's findings
of imputed income, and one decision which affirmed the trial court's
finding. In Gildea v. Gildea,"' the parties had been married for twenty
years during which time the husband was employed in medical sales. Six
months after the dissolution action was commenced, the husband was fired
from his position due to a general decline in the industry. He sought
reemployment and interviewed regularly. The trial court based its alimony
award upon the husband's prior earnings history. The district court
reversed, holding that although a trial court may impute income to a party
who has no income or is earning less than is available to him, it must do so
based upon a showing that the party has the capacity to earn more by the
use of his or her best efforts.'36 However, such a determination must be
based upon a finding that the party to whom income is imputed has chosen
132. The following discussion addresses the issue of imputation of income with respect
to alimony awards. The issue of imputed income in child support cases is discussed in part
V1, section D.
133. 614 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
134. Id. at 595.
135. 593 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
136. Id. at 1213.
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to earn less and has the ability to remedy the situation. In this case, the
husband had been involuntarily terminated from employment through no
fault of his own and had sought reemployment without success. Thus, the
imputation of income under the facts of this case was deemed errone-
ous.137
In Kinne v. Kinne, 38 the husband had sought a modification of his
alimony obligation because he had lost his job and began his own business,
but was earning substantially less than he had earned when employed. The
trial court denied the husband's requested modification, finding that the
husband was "underemployed" and was "capable of earning a greater
income."' 3 9 The district court disagreed and determined that the trial court
failed to apply the good faith test in determining whether the husband
needed to begin his own proprietorship. 40 Absent bad faith on the part
of the paying spouse, the district court opined that, "a court is not entitled
effectively to decide what an ex-husband's current employment should or
should not be.'
141
Thereafter, in Brooks v. Brooks,142 the Second District Court of
Appeal again reversed an imputation of income in an alimony case. The
evidence established that the husband had been diligently seeking employ-
ment, but failed to obtain work despite his best efforts. 43 The district
court noted that the husband had sent out over one hundred resumes, and
that at least twelve rejection letters were introduced into evidence at the trial
level. 44 One of the rejection letters received by the husband indicated
that over one hundred and fifty people had applied for the position in
question. Under these circumstances, the district court held that there was
no evidence establishing that the husband could have earned more than he
was earning at the time of the dissolution of marriage. 145
In McCall v. McCall, 46 the trial court imputed income to the husband
based upon the court's assumption that the husband's live-in girlfriend was,
or should be, paying one-half of the husband's living expenses. The district
court reversed the imputation of income, noting first, that it is "improper"
137. Id.
138. 599 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
139. Id. at 192.
140. Id. at 194.
141. Id.
142. 602 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
143. Id. at 63 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 616 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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for a trial court to treat a roommate's income as though it belonged to the
spouse, and second, that there was no evidence presented that the husband's
live-in companion actually contributed to the husband's expenses.47
Within the past two years, Ugarte v. Ugarte"' was the sole decision
rendered in which the trial court's imputation of income was affirmed. This
decision differed from the other decisions relating to imputed income in one
significant way: the case involved a self-employed physician who, the court
noted, was "able to control and regulate" his own income level.' 49 Thus,
in Ugarte, the trial court's imputation of income to the husband was
affirmed. 5 ' The court noted that self-employed individuals, "in contrast
to salaried employees," may possess tax returns and business records which
"may not reflect their true earnings, earning capacity, and net worth."''
The Ugarte case was the only imputed income case rendered in 1992,
whether involving alimony or child support, in which an imputation of
income by the trial court was affirmed.
The theme of the foregoing decisions is apparent in light of the fact
that in five of the six decisions addressing imputed income in alimony cases
rendered within the past two years, the trial court's imputation of income
was reversed. Therefore, it is clear that the appellate courts are developing
strict standards with respect to imputation of income, and that those
standards must be met in order for such imputation to be sustained on
appeal.
H. Modification
One of the two most significant decisions of 1992 rendered by the
Florida Supreme Court involved the issue of modification of alimony. In
Pimm v. Pimm,5 2 the supreme court responded to a question certified by
the Second District Court of Appeal regarding the effect of the voluntary
retirement of the payor on the payor's alimony obligation. The supreme
court responded that voluntary retirement could justify a reduction in a
payor's alimony obligation provided that such retirement was reason-
able.' In determining whether a retirement is reasonable, the supreme
147. Id.
148. 608 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), cause dismissed, 617 So. 2d 322
(Fla. 1993).
149. Id. at 840.
150. Id. at 839-40.
151. Id.
152. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
153. Id. at 537.
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court directed the trial courts to consider "the payor's age, health, and
motivation -for retirement, as well as the type of work the payor performs
and the age at which others engaged in that line of work normally
retire."'5 4 The court further opined that the age of sixty-five "has become
the traditional and presumptive age of retirement for American workers"
and, therefore, a retirement prior to the age of sixty-five would place upon
the payor "a significant burden" to show that earlier voluntary retirement is
reasonable.' The foregoing notwithstanding, the court cautioned that
"[e]ven at the age of sixty-five or later, a payor spouse should not be
permitted to unilaterally choose voluntary retirement if this choice places the
receiving spouse in peril of poverty," and directed the trial courts to
"consider the needs of the receiving spouse and the impact a termination or
reduction of alimony would have on him or her."' 6
The Pimm decision also addressed another issue which had been
unresolved by earlier decisions of the various district courts of appeal:
whether a party seeking a modification of the provisions of an agreement
carries a heavier burden than a party seeking modification of the provisions
of a final judgment. In Pimm, the Florida Supreme Court specifically held
that "where the alimony sought to be modified was . . . set by the court
upon an agreement of the parties, the party who seeks a change carries a
heavier than usual burden of proof."' 57
I. Amount
Section 61.08(2) of the Florida Statutes specifies a list of criteria which
the trial courts are required to take into consideration in determining
whether alimony shall be awarded and, if so, the nature, type and amount
of such alimony.'58  In 1991, the Florida Legislature amended section
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Pimm, 601 So. 2d at 537 (quoting Tinsley v. Tinsley, 502 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)). See also Tietig v. Boggs, 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992). In Tietig,
the Florida Supreme Court made it clear that the heavy burden rule of Pimm is to be applied
only to alimony modification cases, and that the substantial change in circumstances standard
is to be applied to child support modification cases. Id. at 1251.
158. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1991). The statute requires the courts to consider all
relevant economic factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
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61.08 providing that, effective July 1, 1991, the trial courts "shall include
findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated" therein supporting an
award or denial of alimony.'59 This amendment, and the case law inter-
preting the amendment, led to three decisions from the First and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal, which reversed the trial courts holdings for a
failure to include such findings of fact within the final judgment of
dissolution of marriage. 6 ' These decisions mark the first time that such
holdings have appeared in Florida law.
In Walsh v. Walsh,' 61 the First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's final judgment in its entirety, finding itself unable to review the
judgment because of the absence of findings of fact concerning the wife's
need for alimony and the husband's ability to pay. 162  The district court
opined that the lack of findings made the award of alimony to the wife
"impossible to review," and, therefore, the case was reversed and remand-
ed. 16
3
Similarly, in Jacques v. Jacques, 64 the First District found them-
selves "unable to reach any reasoned decision" because the final judgment
lacked written findings of fact to support the alimony award. 65  Holding
that the amendment to section 61.08(1) required such findings, the First
District reversed the case, noting, "we are unable to discern the trial court's
determination as to the wife's needs and the husband's ability to provide for
such needs.' '
66
(d) The financial resources of each party, the non-marital and the marital assets
and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) When applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to,
services rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career building of
the other party.
(g) All sources of income avoidable to either party.
Id.
159. Ch. 91-246, § 3, 1991 Fla. Laws 2408, 2410 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 61.08(l)
(1991)).
160. See Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Moreno v.
Moreno, 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Walsh v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
161. 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
162. Id. at 1223.
163. Id.
164. 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
165. Id. at 75.
166. Id.
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In Moreno v. Moreno,167 the Fifth District Court of Appeal reached
the same conclusion. Upon the authority of section 61.08(1) of the Florida
Statutes, as amended, the district court reversed the trial court's alimony
award for its failure to make findings of fact, commenting that such findings
are necessary to "meaningful appellate review."' 68
All of the foregoing came to a head in the en banc decision of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in Kennedy v. Kennedy. 169 Therein, the majority
determined that, although the effective date of the statutory requirement for
findings of fact regarding alimony awards was July 1, 1991, the requirement
applied retroactively to cases in which decisions were rendered after such
date. '7 The majority also concluded that the requirement of findings of
fact means written findings in the judgment and not merely oral statements
in the record.'
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES, SUIT MONEY AND COSTS
A. Standards for Awards of Attorney's Fees
Among the most significant decisions of 1992 were three cases
addressing the question of attorney's fee awards. The first, P.A.G. v.
A.F.,' 72 discussed the issue of attorney's fee awards in child support
modification actions brought in cases where the underlying child support
award was entered in a paternity action rather than a dissolution of marriage
action. The second case, Brown v. Dykes,'73 determined the validity of
section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes. A literal reading of the statute
authorized an award of fees in paternity actions only to mothers against
putative fathers. In the third, Sotolongo v. Brake,174 the Florida Supreme
167. 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
168. Id. at 1281.
169. 622 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
170. Id. at 1034.
171. Id. Both Judge Sharp and Judge Diamantis, dissenting, did not agree. Id. at 1037-
39 (Sharp, J., dissenting); Id. at 1040-46 (Diamantis, J., dissenting). Both opined that the
finding of fact requirement of section 61.08(1) of the Florida Statutes may be met with
findings in the record and that the statutory language does not specify that written findings
are required. Kennedy, 622 So. 2d at 1038, 1044. Both also opined that the requirements
of the statute apply only to cases filed after July 1, 1991, and to decisions rendered after July
1, 1991. Id. at 1139, 1043-44.
172. 602 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1992).
173. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1992).
174. 616 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1992).
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Court dealt with whether an attorney's fee award may exceed the amount
of fees provided for in the contract between the attorney and client.
In P.A.G., the Fourth District Court of Appeal had certified the
following question to the Florida Supreme Court: "Whether the Florida
Statutes provide for an award of attorney's fees in a postjudgment proceed-
ing for modification of a child support obligation which was entered in a
paternity action?"'75 The question had arisen because the portion of the
paternity statute dealing with awards of attorney's fees, Florida Statutes
section 742.031, authorizes attorney's fees only for the determination of
paternity proceedings and does not address the award of attorney's fees for
subsequent proceedings.
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
affirmative, finding that the right to seek modification of a child support
order is established by section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes, which pertains
to "enforcement and modification of support, maintenance, or alimony
agreements or orders."' 7 6 The statute does not limit the court's enforce-
ment and modification authority to court-ordered payments arising from
dissolution of marriage proceedings. Instead, the statute provides that, upon
motion of either party, the circuit court has jurisdiction to modify an
agreement, whether in connection with a dissolution or separate maintenance
proceeding or with a voluntary property settlement.' 77 The court also has
jurisdiction "when a party is required by court order to make any pay-
ments." 78 Thus, the fact that an order of child support is entered as a
result of a paternity proceeding does not alter the fact that it is a "court
order" for child support and, therefore, subject to modification pursuant to
section 61.14. Because the modification action is brought under the
authority of Chapter 61 and specifically section 61.14 of the Florida
Statutes, the attorney's fee provisions of Chapter 61, which apply to "any
proceeding under this chapter," apply to the action. 79
In Brown v. Dykes, 8 ' the Second District Court of Appeal was called
upon to determine whether the provisions of the Florida statute dealing with
awards of attorney's fees in paternity actions was invalid on equal protection
grounds, in light of the fact that a literal reading of the statute would
authorize the award of fees only on behalf of prevailing mothers in paternity
175. P.A.G., 602 So. 2d at 1260.
176. Id. at 1261.
177. See FLA. STAT. § 61.14(1) (Supp. 1992).
178. P.A.G., 602 So. 2d at 1261.
179. Id.
180. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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cases. In order to find the statute valid, the Second District determined that
either prevailing party-whether such party be the mother or the putative
father-must be entitled to an award of attorney's fees.''
The Second District noted that Florida's paternity statutes were
amended in 1986 in order to allow either party-the mother or putative
father-to initiate an action for the determination of paternity.'82 Prior to
the amendment, only the mother of a child born out of wedlock could
initiate a paternity proceeding under the paternity statutes and the putative
father was left to resort to other legal remedies, such as an action for
declaratory judgment. A number of constitutional challenges to the paternity
statutes were brought by putative fathers, but the Florida Supreme Court
consistently upheld the validity of the statutes on the basis that putative
fathers had other legal remedies, such as declaratory relief, through which
to seek a determination of paternity. The constitutional challenges
eventually compelled the Florida Legislature to amend the statutes in 1986
to allow paternity actions to be initiated by either party or by the child.'83
However, when the statute was broadened, the Legislature failed to amend
the attorney's fee portion of the statute (section 742.031) which authorizes
the imposition of attorney's fees against the father only.'84
The Second District concluded that a gender-based classification must
be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental
objective to withstand constitutional challenge.'85 The court opined that,
"the validity of any such classification must be determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women."' 86
However, the court further noted that when a statute treats a class of people
covered by the statute unequally, as compared to a class not so covered, a
court may make the choice of applying the statute to both classes or neither.
Thus, the Second District elected to construe the statute as applicable
regardless of gender and held that "a father may apply for attorney's fees
under section 742.031 of the Florida Statutes."'87
181. Id. at 570.
182. Id. at 569.
183. See ch. 86-220, § 150, 1986 Fla. Laws 1611, 1723 (amending FLA. STAT. §
742.011 (1987)).
184. See FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1991).
185. Brown, 601 So. 2d at 569.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 570.
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In Sotolongo v. Brake,' the wife had retained her counsel through
a pre-paid legal services plan and contractually agreed to pay her attorney
at the rate of $60 per hour. At the conclusion of the dissolution of marriage
proceedings, the trial court required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's
fees and the wife's attorney sought a fee award at a higher hourly rate than
called for by the contract with the wife. The supreme court determined that
in cases involving pre-paid legal service contracts, the hourly rate specified
in the contract is presumed to be reasonable and may not be exceeded in a
fee award against the other party.' 9 Accordingly, the contract attorney
is not entitled to compensation over and above the amount specified in the
legal services contract. However, the court further opined that in cases not
involving pre-paid legal service contracts, an attorney's fee award may
exceed the contract amount if the spouse seeking the fee award establishes
that because of the spouse's inferior economic status, the agreed upon fee
was below the customary and reasonable rate charged for similarly situated
clients. 9 ' If the spouse seeking the fee award establishes such facts, then
the burden will shift to the defending spouse to disprove the allegation. The
failure of the defending spouse to disprove the allegation will justify the trial
court enhancing the fee to compensate for the reduction below the
customary and reasonable rate.
B. Miscellaneous
Although the foregoing decisions were the leading cases with respect
to the issue of the standard for awards of attorney's fees, several other
significant decisions were rendered by the appellate courts.
In Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri, Holton & Douberley, P.A.
v. Mullin,'9' the Third District Court of Appeal ordered the husband to
pay the wife's attorney's fees with respect to a certiorari proceeding in
which the husband was not a party. The court found that the basis of the
wife's claim in the appellate court arose from an order entered in a
dissolution of marriage action and, therefore, the appellate proceeding could
be considered a chapter 61 proceeding pursuant to which attorney's fees
may be awarded.' 9 In Jacobson v. Jacobson,93 the Fifth District Court
188. 616 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1992).
189. Id. at 413-14.
190. Id. at 414.
191. 602 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), reviewdenied, Mullin v. Mullin, 613
So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1993).
192. Id. at 957.
193. 595 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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of Appeal held that, where the parties contract through a settlement
agreement, the prevailing party in any enforcement proceeding shall be
awarded his or her attorney's fees.'94 Further, the trial court must enforce
such an agreement and has no discretion to decline to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party.1
95 
.
In Cooper v. Kahn,'96 the Third District Court of Appeal held that a
guardian ad litem in a matrimonial matter must present the same type of
evidence in support of an award of attorney's fees as is required of an
attorney seeking such an award. The trial court must also enter a judgment
setting forth the same type of findings of fact as are required in any other
attorney's fee proceeding.'97
In Mishoe v. Mishoe,98 the First District Court of Appeal held that
a trial court may not "reserve jurisdiction" to award attorney's fees at a
subsequent time if the party to be ordered to pay lacks the ability to pay at
the time of the proceedings.' 99 In Mishoe, the trial court found that the
husband lacked the ability to pay attorney's fees at the time of the final
hearing in the parties' divorce case. However, the court "reserved jurisdic-
tion" to award such fees to the wife in the future, when the husband would
presumably be financially better off. The First District held that once a trial
court makes the factual finding that the husband lacked the ability to pay
attorney's fees, any attempt to defer consideration "into the indefinite
future" was "ineffectual.""2 °  The test, according to the district court, is
the parties' relative ability to obtain counsel at the time of the proceedings
in question. The First District opined that if a court could reserve such a
determination until years after the dissolution, it would stand to reason that
if a party receiving an award of attorney's fees greatly improved his or her
circumstances in the future, that party could be required to reimburse the
payor spouse by the simple means of "reserving jurisdiction.2
194. Id. at 293-94.
195. Id.; see also Rose v. Rose, 615 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Of
course, the parties must have specifically agreed to the use of a "prevailing party" standard
because, absent such an agreement, a "prevailing party" basis for the award of fees in family
law cases is erroneous.
196. 600 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
197. Id. at 36.
198. 591 So. 2d I100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
199. Id. at I101.
200. Id.
201. Id. The court distinguished the type of"reservation of jurisdiction" attempted by
the trial court in Mishoe from the more customary situation in which the trial court deter-
mines an entitlement to attorney's fees and reserves jurisdiction to set the award at a
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There were two decisions rendered in 1993 that are of most interest
regarding the issue of the standard for awards of attorney's fees in
dissolution of marriage actions.2" 2 First, in Pelton v. Pelton,2 °3 the First
District Court of Appeal determined that the trial court must, in determining
both "need" and "ability to pay," reduce the income of the payor spouse by
the amounts required to be paid under the final judgment and increase the
income of the recipient spouse by such amounts. Only after having done
such calculations is the trial court permitted to determine the respective
incomes of the parties for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees.204
Second, in Steele v. Steele," 5 the Second District determined that an
award of attorney's fees in a dissolution of marriage action must pertain to
the relief requested in the actual dissolution proceedings.2 6 In Steele, as
part of the dissolution of marriage action, the wife filed a constructive trust
and partition action against the husband's parents who owned the former
marital residence jointly with the husband. At the conclusion of the case,
the trial court awarded the wife attorney's fees to be paid, in part, by the
husband's parents. The Second District reversed, holding that there was no
statute or case law permitting the award of attorney's fees in a constructive
trust and partition case and, therefore, the husband's parents could not be
made liable for the wife's attorney's fees.20 7
C. Enforcement
Two significant attorney's fees enforcement cases were decided in 1992
and early 1993, specifically City of Tampa v. Hines,208 and Reyf v.
Reyf 2 °9 In Hines, a writ of garnishment for the collection of attorney's
fees was issued against the city of Tampa with respect to a city employee,
a police officer, who owed attorney's fees on behalf of his former wife.
The city contended: that the garnishment statute, section 61.12 of the
Florida Statues, did not permit garnishment of a municipality because only
states and counties are mentioned; that the statute does not mention
subsequent date, noting that the latter is "clearly proper." Id. at n.l.
202. See Steele v. Steele, 617 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,_ So.
2d _ (Fla. 1993); Pelton v. Pelton, 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
203. 617 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
204. Id. at 717.
205. 617 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
206. Id. at 738.
207. Id.
208. 596 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
209. 620 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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attorney's fees among the matters for which such garnishment may be ob-
tained; that "as a matter of public policy, attorney's fees are not as
important as child support" and, therefore, represent a "mere debt" for
which garnishment should not lie; and that being subject to the writ would
constitute an unreasonable burden on the city.2" ° The Second District
Court of Appeal did not agree and held, with respect to three of the city's
four arguments: that the statute has been construed as applicable to
municipalities; that the words "suit money" which do appear in section
61.12 include attorney's fees; and that being subject to a writ of garnishment
constitutes a "relatively small administrative inconvenience" to the city. 21,
With respect to the city's third argument (the public policy argument) the
Second District, without commenting upon the accuracy of the city's
"ranking" of the importance of the fee award, noted that, even if such an
award were of lesser importance than a child support or alimony award,
"such a ranking would not mean that attorney's fees do not justify
garnishment., 21 2 Without counsel, the court commented, "a spouse might
well not be on an equal footing with the opposing spouse and be able to
provide a court with the necessary evidence to support an award of all the
alimony and child support he or she needs., 21
3
Hines dealt with an ordinary writ of garnishment. With respect to a
continuing writ of garnishment, however, the Third District held, in Reyfv.
Reyf , 4 that such a writ is not available for the enforcement of an attorn-
ey's fee award.
V. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Age of Majority
The fact that for over twenty years the age of majority in Florida has
been eighteen has not seemed to diminish the number of cases addressing
the issue of the age of majority and child support issues. During the survey
period, no less than eight cases rendered by the appellate courts dealt with
this issue.
210. Hines, 596 So. 2d at 161.
211. Id at 161-62.
212. Id. at 162.
213. Id.
214. 620 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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In Haydu v. Haydu,"5 the trial court ordered the husband to maintain
life insurance in order to secure the child support ordered paid on behalf of
the parties' minor children. The court did not specify, in the final judgment,
however, that the husband would have the right to remove the children as
beneficiaries as each child attained the age of majority. The First District
reversed the trial court for having failed to include such a cancellation
provision in the judgment, noting that "a father's duty of support expires
when his children achieve their majority."2 '1 6
Similarly, in Harris v. Deeb,2"7 the Second District, in a brief, one
paragraph decision setting forth no facts, stated, "the ex-husband should not
be required to provide life insurance to secure his obligation for support of
a child who dies, marries, becomes emancipated, or reaches majority and its
not thereafter entitled to support." '
Four decisions rendered by the Second District Court of Appeal in
1992 addressed issues pertaining to child support and the age of majority,
specifically: Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Herron,21 9
McCauley v. McCauley,220 Monitzer v. Monitzer,22 ' and Potts v.
Potts.22
2
In Herron, the father had been ordered to pay child support until each
of his children were emancipated pursuant to a decree entered in Indiana
where the age of majority is twenty-one. The father moved from Indiana
to Florida but the children remained in Indiana. In an enforcement
proceeding brought by the mother, the father contended that he was only
obligated to pay support until the children attained the age of majority.
Since he lived in Florida, such an order could only be enforced against him
in Florida until his children attained Florida's age of majority or, in other
words, the age of eighteen. Not surprisingly, the Second District Court of
Appeal did not agree with the father's position and held that "[t]he mere fact
that the father has moved to this jurisdiction which requires support only to
eighteen will not defeat his obligation required under the law of the foreign
jurisdiction which is now being enforced in Florida." '223
215. 591 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
216. Id. at 657.
217. 605 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
218. Id.
219. 592 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
220. 599 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
221. 600 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
222. 615 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
223. Herron, 592 So. 2d at 773 (quoting Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 426 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
[Vol. 18
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/8
Greene
McCauley v. McCauley, a Second District Court of Appeal was heard
en banc for the purpose of resolving the conflict between two earlier
decisions of the Second District, Thomasson v. Thomasson224 and Stultz
v. Stultz. 225  McCauley involved a husband who had been ordered to pay
child support until his child had attained the age of eighteen despite the fact
that at age eighteen the child would still be in high school. The wife
appealed from the trial court's decision to award child support only until age
eighteen and the district court affirmed, holding that if a legal duty to
provide post-majority support while a child remains in high school is to be
created, the legislature "is the fountain out of which that legal duty is to
spring. 226
In the en banc decision in McCauley, the Second District noted that
"there is no legal duty to pay child support beyond the age of eighteen-the
age of majority in Florida-absent a finding of physical or mental deficien-
cies. 227  In Monitzer v. Monitzer,228 the Second District addressed a
case in which such deficiencies were, in fact, present. The evidence
presented to the trial court in Monitzer established that the parties' child,
although she had attained the age of eighteen, remained "dependent" as a
result of"a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to her reaching
majority."2 29 Despite evidence that the child would become independent
at some time in the future, the child was dependent at the time of the
hearing and had been dependent for years prior to attaining the age of
224. 562 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that trial court could
properly find that an eighteen year old child who was still in high school was dependent and
therefore entitled to continuing child support).
225. 504 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a parent cannot be ordered
to continue child support payments on behalf of a child still in high school despite fact that
the child was economically dependent and required continuing support until graduation from
high school).
226. McCauley, 599 So. 2d at 1003. The Second District did not mention the 1991
revision to section 743.07 of the Florida Statutes, which became effective on October 1,
1991, and allows for continuing child support if the child is dependent in fact, is between the
ages of 18 and 19, and is still in high school performing in good faith with a reasonable
expectation of graduation before the age of 19. Ch. 91-246, § 8, 1991 Fla. Laws 2408, 2416
(amending FLA. STAT. § 743.07 (1991)). In Walworth v. Klauder, 615 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993), the Fifth District certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question
of whether section 743.07 is violative of equal protection because of the seemingly arbitrary
cut-off date of the age of 19.
227. McCauley, 599 So. 2d at 1002.
228. 600 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
229. Id. at 575.
1993]
35
Greene: Family Law
Published by NSUWorks, 1993
Nova Law Review
eighteen. As such, the Second District reversed the trial court's refusal to
order the husband to continue to pay support.23°
In the Third District, in Carbonell v. Carbonell,23' the trial court's
requirement that the husband continue to pay child support until such time
as the child "graduates from high school, becomes nineteen years of age
while still attending high school, dies, marries or becomes self-supporting,"
was stricken. The court held that attending high school does not make a
child dependent and that absent a statutory dependency, the obligation to
provide child support ends upon the child attaining the age of majority.232
The last of the post-majority child support cases decided by the Second
District during 1992 involved a situation in which the parties' twenty-six
year old son sued the husband seeking to enforce the terms of his parents'
1980 settlement agreement pursuant to which the husband had agreed to pay
for the son's college education. In Potts v. Potts,233 the district court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action for "failure to state a cause
of action," and held that the child was "entitled to maintain an action against
his father on purely contractual grounds. 234
In arguably the most interesting post-majority child support case of the
year, at least from the perspective of family law practitioners, the Third
District Court of Appeal in Krstic v. Krstic,235 affirmed an order of the
trial court which "reserved jurisdiction" to order the husband to pay for his
children's college education "should that relief become available under
Florida law. ' 236 The Third District opined that the order was not objec-
tionable as it "simply left open the possibility that should the law change,
such relief may be available for the children. 237
In the Fifth District, a very unusual fact pattern emerged in the case of
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Holland,238 which
involved post-majority enforcement of post-majority arrearages. In Holland,
230. Id
231. 618 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
232. Id. The Third District did not mention in this opinion the revisions to section
743.07 of the Florida Statutes, which became effective October 1, 1991.
233. 615 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
234. Id. at 697.
235. 604 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
236. Id at 1246.
237. Id. The Krstic case leaves open the question of whether attorneys should now seek
to have included in final judgments a reservation ofjurisdiction with respect to all possible
forms of relief which are not yet available under the existing law, but may be in the future,
and whether a failure to do so could constitute malpractice.
238. 602 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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the father was obligated to pay support for the parties' minor child beyond
the child's attaining the age of eighteen. After the child attained majority,
child support arrearages accrued and, thus, when the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services sought to collect the arrearages from the father
on behalf of the mother, they were seeking post-majority arrearages through
a post-majority enforcement action. The trial court determined that under
such circumstances, only the child had standing to enforce the obligation
and the district court affirmed.239
The Fifth District began its discussion by noting that there are several
sources for the duty to pay child support.24° The duty can be strictly legal
based on common law or statute, strictly contractual, or a confusion of both.
The confusion arises from the fact that separation agreements appurtenant
to dissolution of marriage actions are often a combination of both legal and
contractual duties, blurred by two practices. The first practice is using
agreements to contract as to the amount satisfactory to discharge a duty
imposed by statute or common law. The second practice is having a court
approve and order payment of purely contract based duties. Thus, confusion
results from the practice of having a trial court approve an agreement
relative to child support, and ordering payment, without distinction as to, or
appreciation for, the difference between a support agreement merely
quantifying the amount correctly necessary to discharge a legal (statutory or
common law) duty, and an agreement establishing a purely contractual duty
to pay an agreed amount of child support.24" '
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Fifth District opined that
(1) under law only one cause of action exists in one entity or person at
one time; (2) that a child for whom child support is due from a parent
is the equitable and legal beneficiary and the real party in interest and
in legal contemplation owns the cause of action to recover due monies
for its support; (3) when a child is under legal disability of non-age or
otherwise, the mother, or anyone else, who is the lawful custodial or
legal guardian for the child or even a next friend, is entitled to collect
child support money owed by the parent to discharge a legal duty for
child support ... ; (4) any non-volunteer stranger has a common law
cause of action against either parent for the cost of necessities provided
a child because of the parent's neglect to meet his or her legal parental
duties to support that minor child ... ; (5) a child of lawful age and
under no legal disability has the legal right to make the decision to
239. Id. at 653-54.
240. Id. at 654.
241. Id.
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enforce, and when to enforce, or not to enforce, its own legal rights;
and (6) one parent of a child, as such, does not have the legal right or
standing to enforce the child's cause of action or to collect support
money from the other parent after the child is of age and is under no
other legal disability.2
42
B. Modification
Six significant decisions regarding child support modification were
rendered in 1992 and 1993, three of them by the Florida Supreme Court.
In Pimm v. Pimm,143 the Florida Supreme Court was called upon to
respond to a question certified by the Second District Court of Appeal with
respect to the effect of a payor's voluntary retirement upon the payor's
alimony obligation. The court responded to the question by holding that
voluntary retirement could, under circumstances in which the retirement was
reasonable, constitute a substantial change in circumstances for the purpose
of decreasing the payor's alimony obligation. The court further noted,
however, that the obligation to pay child support differs from the obligation
to pay alimony and, therefore, "voluntary retirement cannot be considered
a change of circumstances which would warrant a modification of child
support.
244
In reaching its decision in Pimm, the supreme court also opined that a
party seeking a modification of the terms of an agreement, as opposed to the
terms of a judgment, faces a heavier burden of proof with respect to such
modification. Having so held, the supreme court found itself faced with the
problem presented in Tietig v. Boggs,245 in which a husband seeking a
downward modification of child support, had been denied the requested
relief on the basis that he had failed to meet his heavier burden. The Tietig
case then came before the Florida Supreme Court on the basis of conflict
with Bernstein v. Bernstein,246 in which the Fourth District Court of
Appeal had held that the heavier burden standard did not apply to child
support cases because Florida's public policy does not permit the terms of
a contract between parents to impinge upon the best interest of their
children.247
242. Id. at 654-55.
243. 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992).
244. Id. at 537.
245. 602 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1992).
246. 498 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
247. Id. at 1273.
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The supreme court resolved the apparent conflict between its decision
in Pimm-that a party seeking a modification of the terms of an agreement
bears a heavier burden than one seeking the modification of the terms of a
judgment--and Florida's public policy that prevents parents from contracting
to the detriment of their children, by holding that in child support modifica-
tion cases stemming from an agreement rather than a judgment, only the
party seeking a reduction in the amount of child support to be paid bears a
heavier burden. On the other hand, a party seeking an increase in the
amount of child support required pursuant to the terms of an agreement does
not bear such a "burden" and need only establish a substantial change in
circumstances. 48
In Miller v. Schou,249 the husband in a child support modification
case stipulated to his ability to pay any reasonable increase in child support
ordered by the court. Based upon this stipulation, the husband thereafter
refused to file a financial affidavit, contending it was unnecessary. The trial
court ordered him to do so. The Third District reversed, and the Florida
Supreme Court determined that the husband was, in fact, required to submit
a financial affidavit irrespective of his stipulated ability to pay."' On the
issue of the modification of child support itself, the supreme court opined
that an increase in the financial ability of the paying parent is sufficient, in
and of itself, to warrant an increase in child support.2 5'
Two other decisions of import regarding child support modification
were rendered in 1992: Evans v. Evans252 and Manning v. Manning,
253
both from the First District Court of Appeal. In Evans, the parties had been
divorced in 1987, at which time they agreed that the husband would be the
248. Id. at 1271. Contra Landa v. Massie, 593 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 602 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1992). A request for an upward modification of child
support was denied on the basis that the petitioner had a "heavier burden" of proof because
the amount of child support was determined by an agreement between the parties. Id. at
1147. The Landa case, however, was rendered prior to the rendition of the supreme court's
opinion in Tietig v. Boggs.
249. 616 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1993).
250. Id. at 438.
251. Id. at 437-38. But see Kersh v. Kersh, 613 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993), in which the fact that the husband's income had increased by twenty-five percent was
held to be an insufficient basis upon which to order increased child support in which the
husband did not stipulate to an ability to pay any award made, and the husband's lifestyle had
not improved as a result of his increased income as he also had increased expenses. Id. at
586.
252. 595 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
253. 600 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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primary residential parent of their minor children. There was no mention
of child support in the parties' agreement or in the final judgment incorpo-
rating the agreement. Thereafter, the wife petitioned for modification of
custody and the husband counter-petitioned for child support.254 The
wife's petition for modification was denied and, again, no mention was
made in any court order of child support. In 1990, the husband filed a
petition for child support labeled "petition for modification." The trial court
denied the husband's request for child support on the basis that the original
agreement and final judgment did not award any support, and that no
support had been awarded in the parties' first modification case. The
district court reversed, holding that neither the final judgment nor the order
entered as a result of the first modification proceeding bore any indication
that the issue of child support had been considered by the court and that
neither a marital settlement agreement nor any other contract will serve to
abrogate a parent's obligation to support minor children.255
In Manning, the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated that the
standard for a downward modification of child support is a substantial
change in the circumstances of the payor that is "permanent in nature. '"256
The court noted that there is no set "time periods or particular circumstanc-
es" which in and of themselves will demonstrate "permanence"; rather, each
case must be decided on a "reasonable examination of the facts" of the
particular case. 57
C. Enforcement
In one of several Florida Supreme Court decisions rendered within the
past two years addressing family law issues, the court determined that
section 61.181(5) of the Florida Statutes, does not violate the Florida
Constitution by pledging public credit.2 58 In Dixon, the clerk of the court
of Polk County filed a declaratory action asserting that section 61.181(5) of
the Florida Statutes, which requires the disbursement by the clerk of funds
paid to the depository within four days, pledged the public credit because
254. Evans, 595 So. 2d at 988-89.
255. Id. at 990.
256. Manning, 600 So. 2d at 1275-76.
257. Id.; see also Freeman v. Freeman, 615 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
In Freeman, the Fifth District determined that the requirement that a change in circumstances
be "permanent" does not require a showing that the change is "forever." Id. at 226. Rather,
a showing of permanent change requires proof that the change is not temporary or transient,
but rather encompasses an extended period of time.
258. State v. Dixon, 594 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1992).
[Vol. 18
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/8
Greene
the clerk was required to disburse the funds even if the check had not then
cleared.259 The Florida Supreme Court stated that the statute did not
require the pledging of public credit but, further noted, that even to the
extent that it could be held to pledge the public credit, doing so served a
strong public purpose:
It is a matter of national and state concern that children of broken
marriages and children born out of wedlock constitute a large percent-
age of people living in poverty in the United States today. Not only is
the amount of support ordered to be paid often inadequate, but also a
large percentage of the ordered support is never paid. The efforts of the
legislature to increase voluntary compliance with orders of support by
allowing the convenience of payment by personal check, and by making
the funds readily available to dependent spouses and children are
sufficiently strong public purposes to support any incidental pledge of
public credit.26
Three other child support enforcement decisions rendered in 1992 are
of interest to the extent that two imply 26 ' and one holds directly 26 2 that
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Putnam v. Putnam,263 rendered
over fifty years ago, is no longer "good law."
In Putnam, the Florida Supreme Court had held that a child's refusal
to visit with his or her father could serve as the basis of terminating the
father's child support obligation or, in some cases, could serve as the basis
of "forgiving" any child support arrearages that had accrued during the
period of time during which the child refused to visit.264 Not surprisingly,
Putnam continues to be cited as authority for these propositions sixty-four
years after its rendition.
In Carroll v. Carroll,265 the Second District determined that the
numerous changes in Florida law and Florida statutes over the past sixty
years have overruled the holding in Putnam. The Second District reached
this conclusion in a case where the parties' sixteen year old son petitioned
the trial court, in his own name, to terminate his father's visitation rights.
259. Id. at 296.
260. Id. at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
261. See Parker v. Parker, 610 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Department
of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Lemaster, 596 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
262. See Carroll v. Carroll, 593 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
263. 186 So. 517 (Fla. 1939).
264. Id. at 518.
265. 593 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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The trial court did so but also terminated the father's child support
obligation. The district court determined that it was unwilling to say that
conduct of a child, not shown to be orchestrated by one of the parents,
should relieve a parent of his or her duty to support the child because doing
so "would punish only the other parent's ability to pay for that child's
needs.
266
The Second District continued this line of reasoning in Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Lemaster,267 in which the Department,
on behalf of a mother who was owed child support, attempted to collect
nearly twelve years of child support arrearages from the father. The father
defended the enforcement proceeding by alleging that he had not seen his
child during the entire period of time for which he owed child support. The
trial court found that the father had not known the whereabouts of his child
during the time in which the arrearages accrued and thus "forgave" approxi-
mately $9,400 of the $14,900 in child support arrearages due and owing to
the mother. The district court reversed, holding that the obligation to pay
child support and visitation rights are unrelated and that the inability to
exercise visitation does not relieve the non-custodial parent from the
obligation to pay child support.26
These two decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal, particular-
ly the decision in Carroll, appear to conflict with the earlier decision of the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Riley v. Connor,269 in which the Fifth
District opined that "there may be conduct, on the part of a child who has
reached an age of discretion, of such disrespectful and contumacious
character, directed toward the obligor parent," which would justify the
suspension of the duty of support. 7 °  The Second District noted this
apparent conflict in its Carroll decision, but felt that it was simply unable
to agree with the Fifth District as to this point.
27
'
In Parker v. Parker,272 the parties' child refused to visit with the
husband (who had adopted the child at the age of four) because, according
to the child, he felt that the husband "was making him do things he didn't
266. Id. at 1132-33.
267. 596 So. 2d at 1117.
268. Id. at 1118. The court further opined that it would have been "a simple matter"
for the father to have "set aside each child support payment as it became due. Had he done
so, he would not now find the twelve year accumulation of arrearages to constitute an
intolerable lump sum for him to shoulder." Id.
269. 509 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
270. Id. at 1178.
271. Carroll, 593 So. 2d at 1133.
272. 610 So. 2d 719 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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want to do." '273 The child had regained contact with his natural father and
refused to continue to use his adoptive father's surname. The child
threatened to run away if he were ordered to visit with the husband. The
district court awarded child support over the husband's objection that the
child's conduct was so disrespectful and offensive that any requirement that
he pay child support would be an abuse of discretion. 74 The district court
affirmed the support award on the basis that the trial court, through
mandatory counselling and structured visitation, was attempting to resolve
the problems presented by the case.275
D. Imputed Income
As with the imputed income decisions rendered in alimony cases over
the past two years, the appellate courts have reversed every reported case in
which income was imputed by the lower court with respect to child support
awards. During the survey period there were five such cases: one from the
First District Court of Appeal;27 6 two from the Second District Court of
Appeal;27 7 and two from the Third District Court of Appeal. 78
In Neal v. Meek,27 9 the parties were before the trial court in a paterni-
ty action. The father was unemployed but received income from the estate
of his late mother.28 ° The trial court determined that the father was
"'capable of [earning] additional income."' The court, however, did not
state any basis upon which it reached this conclusion nor state any presumed
amount which the father was "capable" of earning. The First District Court
of Appeal reversed, finding that the trial court failed to set forth findings of
fact indicating that it had determined the father's "employment potential and
probable earnings level" or his "recent work history, occupational qualifica-
tions, and prevailing earnings level in the community."2 ''
Similarly, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the two
imputed income cases it decided during 1992 based upon the trial court's
273. Id. at 720.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Neal v. Meek, 591 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
277. Braman v. Braman, 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Wollschlager
v. Veal, 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
278. Edwards v. Edwards, 615 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Levine v.
Best, 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
279. 591 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
280. Id. at 1045.
281. Id. at 1046.
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failure to state the basis upon which the income was imputed. In Braman
v. Braman,282 the trial court imputed income to the wife for child support
determination purposes despite the fact that the wife was unemployed at the
time of the final hearing. The trial court nevertheless assumed that the wife
was capable of earning the "minimum wage," and imputed such income to
her. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that although
the trial court was empowered to impute income to the wife if it was
determined that she was voluntarily unemployed, the trial court nevertheless
erred in failing to disclose the manner in which it calculated the amount of
the wife's child support obligation.283
Likewise, in Wollschlager v. Veal,284 the First District reversed the
trial court's imputation of income to the father, a full time dental student
who was not employed, because the trial court "failed to make sufficient
factual findings as to imputation of income and deviation from the child
support guidelines.""2 5
Recently, the Third District Court of Appeal has also reversed two
imputed income cases. In Levine v. Best, 86 the trial court's imputation of
income was reversed with a finding that the trial court erred in imputing
income "without setting forth what amounts it imputed and the sources of
this income." '287 Similarly, in Edwards v. Edwards,288 the trial court's
imputation of income was reversed where the evidence failed to demonstrate
an ability on the husband's part to pay the amount of the award made by the
trial court.289
VI. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
A. Marital versus Non-marital Assets
All equitable distribution cases may be divided into three categories of
issues: classification, valuation, and distribution. Classification is the
question of which of the parties' assets and liabilities are marital in nature
and, therefore, subject to equitable distribution, and which of their assets and
282. 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 683.
284. 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
285. Id at 275.
286. 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
287. Id. at 279.
288. 615 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
289. Id. at 179.
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liabilities are the separate property of one spouse or the other. With respect
to classification issues, nine significant decisions were rendered by the
district courts of appeal during the survey period.
At first blush, it would appear that the determination of the marital or
non-marital status of an asset or liability would be relatively simple to make
under the provisions of section 61.075, Florida's equitable distribution
statute. The statute provides that if an asset or liability was "acquired ...
during the marriage," then the asset or liability is "marital" unless it was
acquired during the marriage by "noninterspousal gift, bequest, devise, or
descent." '29  The complicating factors, however, are the questions of
commingling-the combination of non-marital or premarital assets with
marital assets-and enhancement-the appreciation in value of a non-marital
or premarital asset due to expenditure of marital labor or funds upon the
asset.
On the subject of enhancement, six significant decisions were rendered
during 1992 and 1993. Unfortunately, a clear conflict between these
decisions is readily apparent. In Moon v. Moon,29' the husband was a
participant in a profit sharing plan which had been commenced prior to the
marriage but was also funded during the marriage. The district court opined
that the portion of the plan funded during the marriage would be a marital
asset.112 The court went on to state that when a premarital asset has been
enhanced in value by the contribution of either marital funds or labors to the
asset, then "further enhancement in value of such marital asset due to
inflation or market conditions will become a marital asset., 293 In other
words, once appreciation in value has been shown, and once it has been
established that marital labors or funds contributed in any way to that
appreciation, then all of the enhanced value will be deemed a marital asset.
The First District repeated this principle in Glover v. Glover.294
Therein, the husband had owned a home prior to his marriage but subse-
quently transferred title jointly to himself and his wife during the marriage.
In reversing the trial court's finding that the husband had a "special equity"
in the home, the district court noted, that "'[o]nce the threshold requirement
of marital labor or funds has been established, increases in value attributable
to marital labor, funds, inflation and market conditions will all apply.'
295
290. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(5) (1991).
291. 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
292. Id. at 820.
293. Id. at 822 (citation omitted).
294. 601 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
295. Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
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Although nearly identical circumstances were present in Young v.
Young,296 another decision from the First District, the decision substantial-
ly differs from the decisions in both Glover and Moon. In Young, the
husband owned a home prior to his marriage but during the marriage a
number of improvements were made to the home, involving both marital
labor and marital funds. The trial court found that the home was entirely
the husband's non-marital property and the First District reversed, holding
that the wife's burden was only to show that marital funds or labors had
been devoted to the non-marital property.291 Once the wife met that
burden, the asset would be deemed marital in its entirety, unless the husband
were able to show that "any part of the enhanced value was exempt from
distribution because it was 'unrelated to either party's management,
oversight or other contribution, but instead due solely to purely passive
appreciation of the original asset.' ' 298
Meanwhile, in Dyson v. Dyson,299 the husband owned ten acres of
land prior to the parties' marriage but during the marriage marital funds
were used toward payment of the mortgage. The district court directed the
trial court to use a four step "formula" in determining the marital value of
the property, specifically: (1) determine the value of the property prior to
the marriage; (2) determine the current value of the property; (3) determine
the extent to which the value of the property "was enhanced by causes other
than the parties' contribution of marital funds and labor"; and (4) determine
the extent to which the value of the property was enhanced by use of marital
funds and labor.3"'
In 1993, the Second District Court of Appeal "joined the fray" with the
rendition of its opinion in Straley v. Frank.3"' In Straley, the district court
reversed the trial court's determination that the appreciated value of certain
property was a marital asset, finding the appreciation was not due to the
expenditure of marital funds, but instead, was the result of "inflation and
fortuitous market forces."3 2 However, with respect to certain real estate
partnerships owned by the husband prior to the marriage, the evidence
296. 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
297. Id. at 1270.
298. Id. (citation omitted).
299. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id. at 324.
301. 612 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, __ So. 2d _ (Fla.
1993). Although Straley is technically an opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal,
it was actually a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, en banc, sitting as the Second
District.
302. Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
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established that marital funds had been used to make mortgage payments on
the properties. The district court opined that, "[t]he appreciation in value
of these two partnerships as a result of the infusion of marital funds was the
amount by which [the husband's] share of the mortgage debt . ..was
reduced during the marriage."3 °3  In other words, even though marital
funds had been used in the preservation of the asset, the amount of
enhancement was determined to be only that attributable directly to the
funds.
In Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, °4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
in a footnote, commented that the increased value of assets solely owned by
one spouse prior to the marriage should be considered marital assets subject
to equitable distribution under certain circumstances. 35 The court stated
that equitable distribution would apply to the extent the increased value of
the assets was the result of either or both spouse's work efforts, or the
expenditure of marital funds or earnings of the parties.3"6
Three decisions on the subject of commingling of marital and
non-marital assets were rendered during the survey period, Amato v.
Amato," 7 Heinrich v. Heinrich,3°8 and Adams v. Adams.3"9 In Amato,
the parties had been married for thirty-five years and had four children. In
1983, one of the parties' adult children was killed in an automobile accident.
Prior to his death he had obtained a life insurance policy through his
employer and had designated his mother (the wife) as the beneficiary. Thus,
upon his death, the wife received insurance proceeds totaling $70,000. The
wife deposited the insurance proceeds into the parties' only bank account,
a joint account, and over the years the parties regularly utilized the funds
and deposited other funds into the account. At the time of the dissolution
of marriage, the wife asserted a "special equity" in $70,000 of the funds
maintained in the parties' joint bank account. The district court determined
the insurance proceeds had lost "their separate identity" and had become
"untraceable" because of the intermingling of funds for a several year period
before the dissolution action.31° Thus the funds were marital assets.3 '
303. Id.
304. 617 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
305. Id. at 329 n.2.
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
308. 609 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
309. 604 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
310. Amato, 596 So. 2d at 1244-45.
311. Id. Interestingly, this holding was not the original holding of the Fourth District
when this case was first decided. See Amato v. Amato, 16 Fla. L. Weekly D2803 (Fla. 4th
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In Heinrich, the husband established a trust with his non-marital,
separate assets during the marriage. However, the husband then purchased
additional trust assets while married with marital funds. The Third District
held the commingling of marital and non-marital funds in the trust
transformed the trust income into a marital asset and any assets purchased
during the marriage with trust income were also deemed to be marital
assets.312
Similarly, in Adams, the Third District determined that commingling
occurred where the husband used his separate non-marital stock as collateral
for marital borrowing. The loans were then repaid with marital funds.
According to the Third District, the use of separate property as collateral for
marital loans causes the collateral to lose its "separate character."3 3
B. Valuation
Although valuation issues in equitable distribution cases are largely
evidentiary matters involving the presentation of testimony as to the specific
value of a specific asset, two issues of statutory interpretation were in the
forefront of the decisional law in 1992. First, what is the proper date for
valuation of assets in equitable distribution cases? Second, does the trial
court have to make specific findings of fact as to its valuation of the parties'
Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1991), opinion superseded on grant of reh'g, Amato v. Amato, 596
So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Initially, the Fourth District determined that the
insurance proceeds were the wife's separate property and that the husband had the burden to
prove that the wife intended to make a gift to him when she deposited the funds into the
parties' joint account, Id. at D2803. The district court first held that the funds in the joint
account at the time of the dissolution were clearly "traceable" because the amount of
insurance proceeds paid to the wife was known. Id. The Fourth District opined that once
the wife was able to establish that a portion of the funds in the joint account was derived
from a non-marital source, then the burden shifted to the husband to prove that the wife
intended to make a gift to him when she deposited the funds into the joint account. Id.
Judge Farmer dissented from the original opinion, noting that once the funds were deposited
into the joint account, they became intermingled with marital funds and were no longer
identifiable. Id. at D2804. Following the rendition of the original opinion in Amato, the
Florida Supreme Court rendered its decision in Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.
1991), a case originating from the Fourth District. The supreme court held that section
61.075 of the Florida Statutes, creates a presumption that jointly titled property is a marital
asset and the burden is upon the party seeking to have such property declared separate to
prove that a gift was not intended when title was taken in joint names. Id. at 493-94.
Thereafter, on rehearing, the Fourth District revised its opinion in Amato. See Amato v.
Amato, 596 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
312. Heinrich, 609 So. 2d at 95-96.
313. Adams, 604 So. 2d at 496.
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assets? In 1992, the case law on these two issues was entirely from the
First District Court of Appeal.
Section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes directs trial courts to value
marital assets at one of three points in time. The marital assets are valued
as the parties enter into a valid separation agreement, or at another date
expressly set forth in such a separation agreement, or as of the filing of the
dissolution of marriage action. However, the statute further provides that
the trial court may use another date if doing so would be just and equitable
under the circumstances of the case.3 14 In Moon v. Moon,3 15 the First
District determined that the trial court could value the parties' assets as of
the date that their separation provided that the court established in the final
judgment that such a date was "just and equitable under the circumstanc-
es." 316
However, in Dyson v. Dyson,3 17 the First District further opined that
the trial courts must state the date of valuation used in the written final
judgment in order to allow for meaningful appellate review. Accordingly,
the First District noted that,
[u]nless the circuit court distributing marital assets in a final judgment
of dissolution of marriage specifically identifies a valuation date of
these assets that is different from the date of filing of the petition and
also recites the specific circumstances and considerations that make use
of this date just and equitable, we shall presume that for such valuation
the circuit court used the date of filing the petition or the date the
parties entered into a valid separation agreement, whichever is earlier,
unless the record contains a specific written agreement executed and
filed by the parties establishing a specific date of valuation.3"'
The second issue with respect to valuation is whether the trial court
must specifically recite the value of each marital asset and liability in the
written final judgment. In a series of three cases: Dyson v. Dyson,3 19
314. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (1991).
315. 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
316. Id. at 822 (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.075(4) (1989)).
317. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
318. Id.; see also Wendroff v. Wendroff, 614 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that the date of valuation should be the date of filing unless the court recites specific
circumstances and considerations that make use of another date just and equitable); Barker
v. Barker, 596 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that compliance with
section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes requires that the trial court specifically state the date
of valuation in the written final judgment).
319. 597 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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Walsh v. Walsh,32 and Nicewonder v. Nicewonder,32 ' the First District
held that such specific valuation findings are required.
In Dyson, the district court concluded that it was unable "to adequately
perform [its] appellate review function in determining whether the circuit
court abused its discretion in distributing the parties' assets" because the
final judgment contained no findings of fact with respect to the value and
amount of the parties' various marital assets and liabilities.32 2 Similarly,
in Walsh, the lack of findings as to valuation was deemed to have made the
trial court's distribution plan "impossible to review.
323
In Nicewonder, the First District concluded that, "[i]f the parties are to
be accorded full and fair appellate review of the findings of fact and rulings
made by the court below, that can be done only if the appealed order sets
forth adequate findings of fact as to valuation assigned to the various
properties by the court.
32 4
This particular problem was resolved by the 1991 amendments to
section 61.075 of the Florida Statutes. Pursuant to section 61.075(3), "any
distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by
factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial
evidence ... .,,325 Further, the statute specifically requires written
findings of fact with respect to the classification (identification) of marital
and non-marital assets and liabilities, the valuation of each marital asset and
liability and the party to whom each asset and liability is awarded.
326
C. Distribution
The question of findings of fact pertaining to equitable distribution in
written final judgments does not solely involve findings as to the date of
valuation or the value of the assets and liabilities distributed. Rather, the
question extends to the actual distribution of assets and whether the trial
courts must specifically state the basis upon which a particular equitable
distribution scheme was made. In 1992, the First, Second and Third
Districts all held that specific findings of fact are required in any case in
which the parties' assets and liabilities are not equally distributed.
320. 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
321. 602 So. 2d 1354 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
322. Dyson, 597 So. 2d at 323.
323. Walsh, 600 So. 2d at 1223.
324. Nicewonder, 602 So. 2d at 1356.
325. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(3) (1991).
326. Id.
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In Barker v. Barker,327 the First District reversed the trial court's
equitable distribution scheme because it was "unable to determine the basis
upon which the trial court distributed the marital assets. 328  The court
further noted "[i]t is appropriate to require explicit findings with respect to
disputed facts that form the factual basis on which a trial court undertakes
to award equitable distribution." '329
In Spillert v. Spillert,331 the trial court distributed sixty-two percent
of the parties' assets to the wife. The First District first noted that the final
judgment did not "set forth any findings in justification of [the] . . .
unbalanced split of the marital assets" and then held that "[i]f the trial court
decides to make an unequal division, the court should make findings which
support its conclusion. 33'
In the Second District, in Burston v. Burston,32 a case very similar
to Spillert, the trial court distributed the parties' only asset-their home-to
the husband without stating any basis for the award. The Second District
held that although specific findings of fact as to the court's rationale for
distribution of assets are not required, the record must show "some logic and
justification for the division. 333  In Burston, because the record did not
indicate such "logic and justification," the absence of written findings of fact
was significant because, as the court noted, "without findings to support the
final judgment we are unable to discern a proper basis therefor. 334
Three cases from the Third District Court of Appeal addressed the issue
of findings of fact with respect to the trial court's equitable distribution
scheme, if that scheme was such that the distribution of assets was not equal
between the parties, specifically, Sinclair v. Sinclair,335 Lozano-Ciccia v.
Lozano,336 and Ibanez- Vogelsang v. Vogelsang.
337
In Sinclair, although no facts are stated in the opinion, the trial court's
equitable distribution was reversed. The district court held that "no
extraordinary showing renders the unequal division appropriate. 338
327. 596 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
328. Id. at 1187.
329. Id. (citation omitted).
330. 603 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
331. Id. at 700. (citation omitted).
332. 604 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
333. Id. at 901.
334. Id.
335. 594 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
336. 599 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
337. 601 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
338. Sinclair, 594 So. 2d at 809 (citation omitted).
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In both Lozano-Ciccia v. Lozano and Ibanez- Vogelsang v. Vogelsang,
the trial court's equitable distribution was clearly unequal and in favor of
the husband. However, the Third District affirmed the unequal distribution
in both cases because the trial court had made specific findings of fact
regarding its justification for the disparate distribution.339
D. Considerations of "Fault" in Equitable Distribution Cases
Two decisions of major significance were rendered by the Third
District Court of Appeal in 1992 regarding the relevance of a party's "fault"
or "marital misconduct" with respect to equitable distribution. In Rosenfeld
v. Rosenfeld,34° the trial court awarded all of the parties' marital assets to
the wife, finding that the husband had "wasted" assets during the marriage
and, therefore, had "already received his equitable distribution." 341 The
"waste" alleged by the wife included the husband having used marital funds
(his income) to support his mother and sister, to pay alimony to his former
wife and to pay attorney's fees to his lawyer with respect to his divorce
from his former wife. The district court reversed, finding that the wife's
allegations were essentially a request that the trial court "revisit the parties'
expenditures throughout the marriage, and should retroactively decide that
certain of the expenditures should not have been made." '342 The Third
District held that a judicial determination of "which spouse was the more
prudent investor and spender" was not an appropriate nor a valid justifica-
tion for a disparate distribution of marital assets.343
In Heilman v. Heilman,344 the wife, after twenty-two years of mar-
riage, left the husband to move in with a woman with whom she had fallen
in love. The trial court denied the wife alimony and made no equitable
distribution to her of the parties' marital assets. The Third District reversed
the denial of equitable distribution to the wife and held that "absent a
showing of a related depletion of marital assets, a party's misconduct is not
a valid reason to award a greater share of marital assets to the innocent
spouse.5345
339. See Lozano-Ciccia, 599 So. 2d at 718; Ibanez-Vogelsang, 601 So. 2d at 1303.
340. 597 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
341. Id. at 837.
342. Id.
343. Id. (citation omitted).
344. 610 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
345. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
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VII. MARITAL HOME
A. Right To Credit
The right of a spouse to a credit at the time of sale, for mortgage and
other related payments made upon the former marital residence following
an exclusive possession award to the other spouse, remains one of the most
confused and complex areas of marital and family law in Florida.
Although, generally speaking, the principles of real estate law
applicable to tenancies in common apply, questions abound. Is an award of
exclusive use and possession to one spouse an "ouster" of the other spouse?
What is the effect of an agreement or a judgment which is silent upon the
subject of credit? Is the spouse out of possession entitled to an award of the
fair rental value of the home? Although a number of appellate courts
attempted to resolve some of these issues in 1992, the questions remain.
There are three possible combinations of factual circumstances giving
rise to the question of credit upon the sale of a residence following an
exclusive possession award. First, the party in possession may pay for all
of the expenses associated with the home during his or her occupancy. In
such case, the party in possession would then seek a "credit" for having
made the other co-tenant's payments during the time of his or her occupan-
cy. Second, if the party in possession has provided for all of the expenses
associated with the home, and seeks a credit for having done so on behalf
of the other co-tenant, then the co-tenant out of possession may seek an
"offset" against such a credit for the fair rental value of the home. Third,
the co-tenants may equally pay for the expenses associated with the home
during one co-tenant's exclusive occupancy but, at the conclusion of that
exclusive occupancy, the co-tenant out of possession may seek reimburse-
ment for the fair rental value of the home for the period of time in which
he or she was out of possession. Various combinations of these factual
circumstances arise on a regular and continuing basis in marital law because
of the prevalence of awards of exclusive use and occupancy to one party in
dissolution of marriage actions.
In Adkins v. Adkins,346 the First District opined that where one
co-tenant has exclusive use of property, and uses the property for his or her
own benefit and does not receive rents or profits from the use of the
property, then the co-tenant in possession is not liable for rent to the
co-tenant out of possession unless he or she holds the property adversely or
346. 595 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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as a result of ouster or its equivalent.347 However, if the co-tenant in
possession under such circumstances makes a claim for a contribution from
the co-tenant out of possession for amounts expended in the improvement
or preservation of the property, then the co-tenant out of possession is
entitled to an offset against such claim for the reasonable rental value of the
property.34 Thus, the First District answered one of the many questions
surrounding exclusive use awards and credits upon the sale of the parties'
former marital residence as follows: the party out of possession will be
entitled to an award of the rental value of the property only as an offset to
a claim by the party in possession for reimbursement of his or her expenses
associated with the property during the term of his or her exclusive
occupancy.
349
Two conflicting opinions were rendered regarding entitlement to credit
in cases where the judgment or agreement is silent upon the issue of
credits.35  In Agerskov v. Gabriel,35 ' the parties' agreement (which was
incorporated into a final judgment) provided that the husband would pay the
mortgage, taxes and insurance on the former marital residence until such
time as it was sold, and upon the sale of the property would receive credit
for any reduction in principal and interest paid, after which the net proceeds
of the sale would be divided equally between the parties. The wife sought
an offset against the husband's credit for the rental value of the home. The
trial court found that because the parties' agreement was silent upon the
issue, general real estate principles applied and, therefore, the wife was
entitled to such an offset. The Second District reversed, holding that
because the parties' agreement made no mention of any entitlement on the
part of the wife to rental value, the trial court could not "modify" the
agreement by providing such a right to her.352
However, in Leventhal v. Leventhal,35 3 the First District held that a
party's right to reimbursement for ownership expenses "exists apart from
347. Id at 1033.
348. Id. at 1033-34.
349. Id.; see also Brisciano v. Byard, 615 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.) (holding
that if the co-tenant in possession seeks contribution for amounts expended in improvement
or preservation of property, including payments for mortgages, insurance, and taxes, that
claim may be offset by the reasonable rental value of the property), review denied, _ So.
2d _ (Fla. 1993).
350. Compare Agerskov v. Gabriel, 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) with
Leventhal v. Leventhal, 606 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
351. 596 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
352. Id. at 1172-73.
353. 606 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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any judgment or agreement. Such right is an implied term of any judgment
that is silent on the issue.
3 54
To be sure, there are distinctions between Agerskov and Leventhal. In
Agerskov, the party out of possession was seeking a credit for the rental
value of the property while the credit to be received by the party in
possession was specifically addressed by the parties' agreement. In
Leventhal, the party in possession was seeking a credit for the payments
made by him upon the property during the time of his possession. The
distinction between: who is seeking the credit, the party in possession or the
party out of possession; and, for what entitlement, reimbursement for
expenses actually paid or the fair rental value of the property, may be of
significance.355
B. Other Issues
Two cases involving the propriety of the filing of a lis pendens in
dissolution of marriage actions were decided in 1992, specifically, Finkel-
stein v. Finkelstein,356 and Gay v. Gay.357
In Finkelstein, the husband and wife entered into a settlement
agreement pursuant to which, in pertinent part, the wife was completely
absolved of any responsibility to pay child support. Thereafter, the husband
moved for modification and sought an award of child support from the wife.
The wife then petitioned to set aside the entire agreement which had also
required her to transfer her interest in the parties' former marital residence
to the husband. The wife filed a lis pendens against the property and the
husband moved to dissolve the lis pendens upon the grounds that he was
354. Id. at 1272 (citation omitted).
355. The Agerskovcourt noted an apparent conflict in the decisional law between the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, and the First and Third District Courts of Appeal. The
Fourth District held in both Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
and Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), that the right to credit
for payments made upon property by one co-tenant is an implied term of any agreement or
judgment that is silent upon the issue. In Janer v. Janer, 532 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) and Everett v. Everett, 561 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
576 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1990), the Third and First Districts held that the trial court cannot grant
a right to a credit if such right does not appear in an agreement or judgment, as doing so
would be an impermissible modification of the property terms of ajudgment or agreement.
The Second District distinguished its opinion in Agerskov from Brandt by opining that the
party seeking the credit in Brandt was the party in possession whereas the party seeking the
credit in Agerskov was the party out of possession. Agerskov, 596 So. 2d at 1173.
356. 603 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
357. 604 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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attempting to secure refinancing and the existence of the lis pendens
interfered with his ability to do so. The trial court discharged the lis
pendens and the district court reversed, holding that the party moving for the
discharge of a lis pendens has the burden of proving that the lis pendens
was inappropriate to the circumstances and cause of action stated in the
complaint, and that the party filing the lis pendens has an adequate remedy
at law and would not suffer irreparable harm if the court were to discharge
the notice.358
Of interest is the fact that the Fourth District's holding in Finkelstein
appears to be in direct conflict with the holding of the Fifth District in
Chiusolo v. Kennedy,359 in which the Fifth District, en banc, held that the
proponent of a notice of lis pendens bears the burden of proving irreparable
harm, an inadequate remedy at law and a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits.36
In any case involving the filing of a lis pendens, if the filing is not
premised upon a duly recorded instrument or a mechanic's lien, then the
trial court may control and discharge the lis pendens in the same manner as
the court may control and dissolve an injunction. In Gay, the Fifth District
was called upon to determine whether a deed to property held in the wife's
sole name entitled the husband in a dissolution of marriage action to file a
lis pendens against such property based upon a "duly recorded instru-
ment.
3 61
The wife, in Gay, initiated dissolution of marriage proceedings and the
husband filed a lis pendens with respect to two parcels of property that were
titled in the sole name of the wife but conceded to be marital assets. Both
properties were encumbered by a single mortgage which was delinquent and
neither party had the ability to pay the note. The wife negotiated for the
sale of the property and the husband objected to the sale alleging that he had
not been consulted with respect to the negotiations and that the sales price
was too low. The trial court dissolved the husband's lis pendens in order
to permit the wife to sell the property. On appeal, the husband contended
that the trial court lacked the authority to dissolve the lis pendens because
his underlying action (a counterclaim for dissolution of marriage) was
founded upon a recorded instrument, specifically, the deed to the property
which recited that the wife was "a married woman. 3 62 The Fifth District
358. Finkelstein, 603 So. 2d at 715.
359. 589 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
360. Id. at 421.
361. Gay, 604 So. 2d at 905.
362. Id.
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disagreed, holding that the husband's action was founded upon the statutory
provisions that allow the dissolution of an irretrievably broken marriage and
that the award of marital assets in such a case is a collateral issue. The
court further held that the existence of a deed reciting that the owner of the
property in question was a "married woman" at the time she acquired the
title to the property "did nothing to establish rights between the parties. 363
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Jurisdiction
In one of the most talked about decisions of the past decade, the
Florida Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in
Waite v. Waite.364 Therein, the supreme court determined that sufficient
reason for the continuation of the doctrine no longer existed and that both
public necessity and fundamental rights required judicial abrogation of the
doctrine.365 In discussing the principles under which the continuation of
the doctrine was formerly upheld, the court opined that there was no reason
to believe that married couples are any more likely to engage in fraudulent
conduct against insurers than anyone else; and, that there was also no reason
to believe that the type of lawsuits prohibited by the doctrine, if allowed, are
likely to foster unwarranted marital discord.366
As to other jurisdictional issues arising in family law cases, a review
of the case law reported during the survey period reflects that the district
courts of appeal were called upon to address nearly every jurisdictional issue
imaginable in dissolution of marriage actions, specifically: long-arm
jurisdiction, the type of jurisdiction obtained when service is constructive
rather than personal, and the definition and meaning of the residency
requirement.
In McCabe v. McCabe,367 the husband was in the military throughout
the parties' marriage. He retained his legal residency in Florida, maintained
363. Id. Another interesting holding in Gay is that a trial court has the power to order
a marital asset sold during the pendency of a dissolution of marriage action despite the
objection of the other spouse. The district court opined that "a trial court should have the
discretion to issue such orders as will preserve an asset or its proceeds for ultimate
disposition for the benefit of both parties." Id. at 907.
364. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
365. Id. at 1361.
366. Id.
367. 600 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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a Florida driver's license and filed federal income tax returns using a
Florida address. The husband petitioned for dissolution of marriage in
Florida and served the wife in North Carolina. The wife contested Florida's
jurisdiction and filed an affidavit stating that the parties had lived in Maine
throughout their marriage and, following the husband's discharge from the
military, had taken up residency in North Carolina with the intent to remain
there permanently. The trial court nevertheless determined that the wife was
a resident of Florida.368 The district court reversed, finding the husband's
allegations in his petition deficient for long-arm jurisdiction purposes
because the husband did not allege that the parties had maintained a marital
domicile in Florida at the time of the commencement of the action or that
the wife had resided in Florida prior to the filing of the action.369 The
husband's failure to so plead rendered the service of process upon the wife
under the long-arm statute void."
McCabe also addressed a second jurisdictional issue-the meaning and
definition of the residency requirement-as did two other decisions rendered
in 1992: Anechiarico v. Thompson37' and Sragowicz v. Sragowicz.37 2
In McCabe, the trial court relied upon the "general rule" that a wife's
residency follows that of her husband, despite the fact that the wife filed an
affidavit contesting the residency claims raised in the husband's petition for
dissolution of marriage. The district court reversed, holding that the fact
that the husband may be a resident of Florida does not "automatically confer
upon the trial court personal jurisdiction over the wife because the residence
of a wife does not necessarily follow that of her husband when facts
pertinent to her particular case indicate otherwise. 373
In a case that may be read as a corollary to McCabe, the Fourth
District, in Anechiarico, held that the trial courts are required to hold
evidentiary hearings when jurisdictional issues are raised by either party.3 74
368. Id. at 1184.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 1184-85. See also Bimbaum v. Birnbaum, 615 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), in which the wife attempted to secure long-arm jurisdiction over the husband
by alleging that the husband had committed a tortious act, physically abusing her, while the
parties resided in Florida. The Third District held that the allegation of tortious acts of abuse
cannot provide the basis for long-arm jurisdiction and, further, that long-arm jurisdiction
based upon previous residence in the State of Florida may only be obtained where the
residency in Florida "proximately precede[d]" the cause of action. Id.
371. 596 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
372. 591 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
373. McCabe, 600 So. 2d at 1184.
374. Anechiarico, 596 So. 2d at 514.
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Lastly, in Sragowicz, the Third District determined that the claims of
residency by a wife were insufficient to establish her residency for
dissolution of marriage purposes.375 In this case, the wife came to Florida
from Brazil for the purpose of visiting her mother and attending a wedding.
The wife left all of her furniture, most of her clothing and most of the
children's clothing and toys in Brazil. The wife came to Florida with one
suitcase and did not register to vote or seek a homestead exemption with
respect to the parties' Florida condominium. The district court determined
that the evidence established that the wife had no intention of residing in
Florida at the time she came to Florida and did not develop an intention to
remain in Florida until sometime later when she and the husband had an
altercation." 6 As such, it was held that the wife failed to show "by clear
and convincing evidence" that she had resided in Florida with the intention
to make Florida her permanent residence six months prior to the filing of
her dissolution of marriage action. 77
Meanwhile, the Second District Court of Appeal, in Steffens v.
Steffens,37 determined the extent of jurisdiction obtained by resort to
constructive service of process in a dissolution of marriage action. Therein,
the husband was never personally served with process and the trial court
obtained jurisdiction over the dissolution proceeding through publication of
notice and constructive service. The husband never appeared and a default
judgment was entered against him. The default judgment, however,
purported to award the wife a sum in excess of $100,000 representing the
"proceeds" of a certificate of deposit which was in the joint names of the
parties and which the husband had cashed in when the parties separated.
The default.judgment further awarded the wife a series of "credits" against
the husband's share of the certificate of deposit for certain costs, which the
wife claimed to have incurred as a result of an attempted purchase of
property which could not go forward following the parties' separation.
Lastly, the default judgment also purportedly awarded the wife her
attorney's fees, suit money and costs incurred in the proceedings. Ultimate-
ly, the husband moved to set aside the judgment. The district court
determined that such relief was entirely proper because of the court's total
lack of personal jurisdiction over the husband at the time of the entry of the
judgment in question.379 Without such personal jurisdiction, the district
375. Sragowicz, 591 So. 2d at 1084.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1085.
378. 593 :So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
379. Id. at 1157.
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court opined, all of the relief granted in the judgment other than the basic
dissolution of marriage, was "void and unenforceable.""3 '
Three interesting venue cases were decided during the survey period,
specifically, Brown v. Brown,38' Bowman v. Bowman,382 and Washington
v. Washington.3 The Brown decision merely recited the established long
established rule that venue in a dissolution of marriage action lies in the
county in which "the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing
union of the parties who intended to remain married, indefinitely, if not
permanently.""'
The Bowman case is unique because of the wife's attempt therein to
place a new slant to the firmly established rule as recited in Brown. In
Bowman, the wife, with the husband's consent and cooperation, moved from
Tallahassee to Palm Beach. Five months later, the husband petitioned for
dissolution of marriage and filed the action in Tallahassee. The wife sought
a change in venue from Tallahassee to Palm Beach, contending that venue
should lie in Palm Beach because the husband had agreed to her relocation
to that county. The district court, in holding fast to the well established rule
of venue in dissolution of marriage actions, held that it was unable to locate
any case finding that one party's consent to the other party's relocation had
any relevance to the issue of venue in a dissolution matter." 5
The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of venue in
Washington, a child support modification case. The court held that venue
may lie either in the county of the court issuing the original decree, or in the
county in which either party is residing when the modification petition is
filed.386
380. Id. at 1157. The wife in Steffens also claimed that the trial court had jurisdiction
because it acquired "in rem" jurisdiction over the certificate of deposit which she claimed bad
been described in her pleadings. The district court, however, held that property over which
such in rem jurisdiction is sought or obtained must be specifically described in the petition
and notice of constructive service. Id. at 1158. In the Steffens case, however, the wife's
pleading only stated that the parties had owned a certificate of deposit and the husband had
withdrawn the proceeds thereof several months before the filing of the action. Further,
according to the wife's petition, the whereabouts of the proceeds was unknown to her. As
such, no property was described in the wife's petition in a sufficient manner as to permit the
court to acquire in rem jurisdiction over such property. Id.
381. 592 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
382. 597 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
383. 613 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
384. Brown, 592 So. 2d at 326.
385. Bowman, 597 So. 2d at 399.
386. Washington, 613 So. 2d at 594-95.
[Vol. 1 8
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/8
Greene
B. Discovery and Privileges
Three very significant decisions regarding discovery issues in family
law cases were rendered by the appellate courts within the past two years,
specifically, Schouw v. Schouw, 387 Pyszka, Kessler, Massey, Weldon, Catri,
Holton & Douberley, P.A. v. Mullin,388 and Swift v. Swift.389
In Schouw, the wife sought to compel the release of the husband's
psychological records, claiming that the husband was "mentally unstable"
based upon circumstances which the wife claimed existed approximately six
years earlier. The district court reversed the trial court's order releasing the
records and held that the wife's "mere allegations" that the husband was
"mentally unstable" were not sufficient to place the husband's mental health
in issue in the case and thereby overcome the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.39
Similarly, in Swift, the wife sought to depose the husband's psycholo-
gist and to inquire about "any extramarital relationship" which the husband
may have had during the parties' marriage. The wife attempted to defend
her discovery request by asserting that she was merely investigating the
husband's credibility because he had been asked in deposition whether he
had been faithful to his wife. The trial court denied the husband's request
for protection and the district court reversed holding, first, that issues of
"marital misconduct" are relevant in dissolution proceedings only where
such misconduct is alleged to have caused or contributed to economic
difficulties such that regardless of how the marital resources are divided, the
parties will suffer economic hardship.391 As to the wife's argument that
the discovery related to issues of the husband's credibility, the district court
opined:
[T]here is no case law support for the proposition that the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege is waived simply when a patient answers a
question by opposing counsel as to whether he engaged in any affairs.
Neither is there any support for the contention that denying such a
suggestion by counsel makes the issue suddenly relevant.392
387. 593 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
388. 602 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
389. 617 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
390. Schouw, 593 So. 2d at 1201.
391. Swift, 617 So. 2d at 835.
392. Id.
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In Mullin, the wife issued a subpoena to the law firm employing the
husband, seeking to determine the husband's interest in the law firm. The
law firm was not a party to the dissolution proceedings but nevertheless
filed an affidavit stating that the husband was a non-equity partner. The
trial court refused to issue a protective order following the submission of the
law firm's affidavit despite the fact that the wife's subpoena sought the
production of extensive documentation regarding the assets and income of
the law firm and the partners in the firm. The district court reversed,
finding the wife's discovery request overbroad, and limited the wife to
discovery specifically pertaining to the husband and documents (such as the
stock register) establishing the husband's lack of ownership interest in the
firm.
393
C. Judges and Masters
The past two years brought three significant decisions with respect to
the role of masters in the family court: one from the Florida Supreme Court
and two at the appellate level. 394 The decisions rendered at the appellate
level indicate a clear pattern of the appellate courts advancing a rather "hard
line" with respect to compliance with procedural requirements.
In Heilman v. Heilman,395 the supreme court determined that a party's
consent is not required in order for a master to hear a child support
enforcement proceeding because of the difference between Rule 1.490 and
Rule 1.491 of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife, in Heilman, filed
a motion for contempt against the husband with respect to the husband's
alleged failure to pay child support. The matter was referred to a hearing
officer pursuant to Rule 1.491 of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
husband objected to having the hearing held before a hearing officer. In
order to preserve his objection, the husband refused to participate in the
hearing. The trial court determined that the consent of both parties is not
required in order for a child support enforcement proceeding to be heard by
a hearing officer.396 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, but
certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court. The supreme court held
that Rule 1.491 constitutes a distinct and separate process from Rule 1.490
393. Mullin, 602 So. 2d at 955.
394. Heilman v. Heilman, 596 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1992); Gordin v. Gordin Int'l, Inc., 605
So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Petrakis v. Petrakis, 597 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
395. 596 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1992).
396. Id. at 1046.
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of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the latter of which addresses the power
and authority of masters (general and special) and requires the consent of
both parties to such a hearing, and the former of which provides for certain
child support matters to be heard by "hearing officers" and does not
expressly require the consent of the parties.397
In Petrakis v. Petrakis,398 the Third District Court of Appeal deter-
mined that the responsibility of ensuring that a written record of proceedings
held before a master lies with the master, not with the parties. Therein, the
trial court had denied the husband's exceptions to a master's report and
recommendations upon the basis that the husband had failed to present a
record of the proceedings to the trial court for review. The district court
reversed, holding that Rule 1.490 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the evidence presented to a master be reduced to writing and
filed with the master's report. The burden of doing so, according to the
Third District, is upon the master and it is not the burden or responsibility
of the parties to create or produce the required written record.399
Similarly, in Gordin v. Gordin Int'l, Inc.,4°° the Fourth District held
that a master's "sketchy, handwritten notations of the proceedings" were
insufficient to comply with the requirement that the master file a written
record of the evidence along with the report.4 1' Thus, as in Petrakis, the
district court placed the burden of creating, preparing and producing a
written record of the proceedings upon the master, not upon either party.
In Prater v. Lehmbeck,4 °' the Fourth District struck a trial court order
that required a party to object to a referral to the general master within five
days or be deemed to have waived any objection. The court held that "such
a practice violates the above-cited rule and has been condemned in other
cases." 43  The court also held that where one party has filed a "blanket
objection" to any and all referrals to the master, the trial court may not
require that party to file a separate objection each and every time a referral
is attempted. 4
On the subject of trial judges and disqualification, the last two years
brought a number of decisions involving the impropriety of certain actions
397. Id. at 1047.
398. 597 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
399. Id. at 857-58.
400. 605 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App. 1992).
401. Id. at 155.
402. 615 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
403. Id. at 761.
404. Id.
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and statements by trial judges in terms of the appearance of impartiality.4" 5
However, the more interesting development was the discussion of the
standards for disqualification of a trial judge where a previous disqualifica-
tion had occurred in the case.
Pursuant to section 38.10 of the Florida Statutes, when a judge has
been disqualified on the basis of alleged bias and prejudice in a given case,
the second judge in the case "is not disqualified on account of alleged
prejudice ... unless such judge admits and holds that it is then a fact that
he does not stand fair and impartial between the parties."4 6
In Rodriguez-Diaz v. Abate,4"7 a non-matrimonial case, the Third
District described the distinction between a first and a later request for
disqualification as requiring that a "more stringent standard" be applied to
a second request for disqualification, specifically, a trial judge may not be
disqualified for bias and prejudice in a case once a previous judge was so
disqualified unless the judge specifically "admits and holds" that it is fact
that he or she does not stand fair and impartial between the parties.40 8 In
Radin v. Radin, °9 the Third District applied this "more stringent standard"
to a disqualification request in a matrimonial case.
IX. PATERNITY
A. HLA Testing
Although the past two years brought a number of cases dealing with
what has become a rather "standard" issue in family law-the use of a
denial of paternity to attempt to avoid enforcement of child support
arrearages 4 -the more interesting development in the law has been a line
405. See, e.g., Loss v. Loss, 608 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (trial judge
became overly involved in the parties' settlement negotiations); Wayland v. Wayland, 595
So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (trial judge was disqualified for advising the
divorcing parties that she might know someone who would be interested in buying their
house).
406. FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1991).
407. 598 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
408. Id. at 198.
409. 593 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 599 So. 2d 1279
(Fla. 1992).
410. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Overby, 613 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The
result in all such cases is consistent: The award of child support presumes that the putative
father was determined to be the father of the child and such finding is res judicata and the
father is estopped to deny paternity thereafter. Id.
[Vol. 18
64
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/8
Greene
of cases addressing the propriety of a party's denial of paternity within a
dissolution of marriage action. In 1993, the Florida Supreme Court
addressed this issue for the first time in Department of Health & Rehabilita-
tive Services v. Privette.41'"
In Privette, a petition was filed on behalf of the mother of a minor
child, alleging that the mother was unmarried and that Privette was the
natural father of the child. In fact, the mother was married at the time of
the birth of the child and the child's birth certificate listed her husband as
the father of the child. Privette objected to the court-ordered HLA testing
and claimed an invasion of his privacy rights. The supreme court, however,
was far more concerned with the rights of the minor child and the rights of
the person presumed to be the child's father to a continued relationship with
the child he believed to be his own:
Once children are born legitimate, they have a right to maintain that
status both factually and legally if doing so is in their best interests.
The child's legally recognized father likewise has a unmistakable
interest in maintaining the relationship with his child unimpugned such
that his opposition to the blood test and reasons for so objecting would
be relevant evidence in determining the child's best interests. 4 12
Thus, the supreme court opined, even if an HLA test were to show that
a person other than the husband in an intact marriage in which a child is
born is the natural father of a child, this fact, without more, would not
constitute grounds to grant a paternity petition:
While there may be some cases where the child has had little contact
with the legal father, other cases will be quite the contrary. It is
conceivable that a man who has established a loving, caring relationship
of some years' duration with his legal child later will prove not to be
the biological father. Where this is so, it seldom will be in the
children's best interests to wrench them away from their legal fathers.
The law does not require such cruelty toward children.1
Once HLA testing has been performed, the next question to arise is the
manner in which, from an evidentiary perspective, the results are presented
to the trial court. In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v.
411. 617 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1993).
412. Id. at 307-08.
413. Id. at 309.
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Moore,4 14 HLA testing performed upon the putative father and the child
indicated that the putative father was, in fact, the child's father within a
99.9% degree of likelihood. The trial court, however, never knew of the
results of the HLA testing because counsel for the mother was unable to lay
a proper evidentiary predicate. When the father's objections to the
admission of the test results were sustained, counsel for the mother
attempted to argue that the results should be admitted into evidence because,
first, the father had not objected "in advance" of the trial and, second,
because the test was performed at the father's insistence. The Fifth District
Court of Appeal opined that neither of such facts overcame the rules of
evidence and there is no such things as "advance notice of the intent to
adhere to the rules of evidence ....
B. Other Issues
Without question, the three most talked about decisions from the
Florida Supreme Court during the survey period are Mize v. Mize,416
addressing parental relocation issues; Waite v. Waite,417 in which the court
abrogated the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Florida; and B.J.Y v.
MA4., 418 in which the Florida Supreme Court determined that the statute
which eliminated the right to trial by jury in paternity cases was unconstitu-
tional.
In B.J. Y, the Florida Supreme Court traced the history of paternity law
in Florida, finding that the nature of such proceedings has not changed since
1828.4'9 Although the procedure for bringing such an action has changed
somewhat, the proceeding and its purpose remain the same: to establish
paternity for the purpose of providing for the support of the child. The
Constitution provides for a right to a jury trial in situations where a jury
trial was conducted as a matter of right prior to the adoption of the
Constitution. The supreme court's history of paternity actions established
that at the time of the adoption of Florida's constitution, paternity cases
were tried by jury.42 ° Therefore, the constitution requires that the right to
trial by jury in a paternity case be preserved and, as such, the statute which
414. 603 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
415. Id. at 14
416. 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993).
417. 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993).
418. 617 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1993).
419. Id at 1062-63.
420. Id. at 1062.
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eliminated the right to a jury trial in such cases was deemed unconstitution-
al.
Although B.J Y was clearly one of the most interesting cases of the last
two years, one of the more compelling cases of the last two years, at least
from a perspective of a lay person's traditional view of "equity" was
Wollschlager v. Veal.42' At issue in this paternity case was a father's
claim that he should not be ordered to support the child that he fathered
because he had been "defrauded" by the mother, who had assured him that
she was taking birth control pills. According to the father, it would be
"inequitable" to require him to bear the financial responsibility of a child
who would never have been born except for the "fraud" committed upon
him. This argument notwithstanding, the First District Court of Appeal held
that there was nothing in the statutory history of the paternity statutes which
would indicate that "the court should look at the question of which party
was more responsible for conception or the factors leading up to the
conception in determining the appropriate child support." '422
A second common issue to arise in paternity proceedings is the
appropriate surname to be given to the child. Within the past two years,
two cases have addressed this issue.
In Brown v. Dykes,4"3 the trial court ordered that the child bear the
surname of the mother, believing it was statutorily required to so order
because custody had been awarded to the mother. The district court
reversed, holding that section 382.013(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes permits
the trial court, in a paternity action, to determine the appropriate surname
for the child.424
Similarly, in Levine v. Best,425 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that the trial court has the power and authority to determine what shall
be a child's surname in a paternity case and that the basis for the trial
court's decision should be the "best interest of the child. 426
421. 601 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
422. Id. at 277.
423. 601 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 613 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1992).
424. Id. at 569.
425. 595 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
426. Id. at 279.
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X. SHARED PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Relevant Factors
Because of the deference given to a trial court's "custody" (now termed
"primary residence") decision, cases at the appellate level discussing the
factors which may weigh in favor of one party or the other are somewhat
rare. However, within the past two years three decisions have been rendered
reversing the trial court's custody decisions.
In Wagler v. Wagler,4" the trial court determined that both parties
were "equally fit" despite the fact that the husband lived in a fine home and
had enrolled the child in an excellent school in which the child was doing
very well, and the wife lived in a "dirty, cluttered room," had lived in
twelve different residences in the three years prior to the final hearing, and,
at the time of the final hearing, was on probation for selling drugs. Further,
at the time of the final hearing, the wife had just completed an earlier
probation from an adjudication, in three criminal cases, that she was guilty
of passing worthless checks. The trial judge commented, "I'm still old
fashioned enough to believe that a child of this age is best served in the
custody of the mother . ,,428 To be sure, the appellate court reversed
this decision and remanded the case to the trial court so that the trial court
could "explain on what basis it determined that the child's interest would be
equally served by the father or the mother. 4
29
In Braman v. Braman,43 ° the Second District was similarly confronted
with a situation in which the facts demonstrated the mother of the child to
be a less than sterling moral example to others. In Braman, the wife
engaged in "recurring episodes of ... extramarital activity while the child
was present in the home., 43 Indeed, only one of the parties' two children
was fathered by the husband. The trial court awarded sole parental
responsibility of the child to the father on the basis that the mother was
"morally unfit" to share in the parental responsibility of the child. The
district court of appeal reversed, holding that a trial court must consider all
of the relevant factors set forth in section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes, in
427. 593 So. 2d 602 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
428. Id. at 603.
429. Id. at 604. But see Murphy v. Murphy, 621 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that specific, written findings of fact regarding the basis upon which the trial
court reached its custody decision are neither required nor favored). The Wagler case, of
course, is somewhat exceptional because of its facts.
430. 602 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
431. Id. at 683.
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making a custody decision and may not base such a decision entirely upon
just one of those factors.432
In Lane v. Lane,433 the Fourth District addressed the factors to be
considered by the trial courts in making a custody and/or visitation
determination. The court held that it is the trial judge who must weigh the
factors, gauge the appearance and demeanor of the parties and make the
decision and the judge may not abdicate such decision-making to any other
person be that person a parent or an expert.43' The parties stipulated in
mediation that the question of whether the husband's visitation with the
minor child should be supervised or unsupervised would be made by a
certain psychologist. The psychologist rendered a report recommending
unsupervised visitation and the trial court reached its decision in the case by
resort to the "novel time saver" of the case being submitted upon written
submissions by each party setting forth each party's position. The district
court held that the type of decision made in custody and visitation cases is
"too important to both the child and parents to restrict a determination to a
reading of unemotional and dispassionate words on a printed page." '435
B. Third Party Custody
Third party custody claims involve actions for custody of a child
initiated by a person other than the mother or father of the child. Normally,
such claims are initiated by a relative of the child and frequently that
relative is the child's grandparent. The standard for the determination of
such custody claims is not the "best interest of the child" standard used in
dissolution of marriage or other proceedings between the child's natural
parents, but rather, is a far stricter standard under which custody will not be
denied a natural parent absent a showing that the parent is "unfit."
In In re Matzen,436 the First District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's refusal to grant custody of a child to his natural father and
award of custody to the child's grandparent, holding that a natural parent's
right to fellowship and companionship with his or her offspring is "a rule
older than the common law itself."'437 The trial court had determined, at
the time of the parent's divorce, that neither parent was "fit." The minor
432. Id.
433. 599 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
434. Id. at 219.
435. Id.
436. 600 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
437. Id. at 488.
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children were then living with the maternal grandmother which the trial
court continued in effect. The father later petitioned for modification of
custody, alleging that he was fit and able to assume the custody of his
children. The trial court denied the modification request and the district
court reversed, holding that a denial of custody to the natural parent may be
sustained only upon a finding by the trial court, supported by clear,
convincing and compelling evidence, that the natural parent is unfit or the
placement of the child with the parent will be detrimental to the welfare of
the child. 38
The number of such "third party custody cases" notwithstanding, there
remains a substantial question under Florida law regarding the manner in
which such "custody cases" are brought before the court. In In re C.M, 43 9
the Fourth District Court of Appeal determined that there is no authority,
statutory or otherwise, which permits a non-parent to petition for "custody"
other than through a chapter 39 dependency proceeding.440
C. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Over the past several years the number of decisions interpreting and
implementing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act have continued
to increase despite the fact that the Act has been law in the State of Florida
for nearly fifteen years. In 1992 and 1993, four significant appellate
decisions were rendered regarding the U.C.C.J.A.
In Lamon v. Rewis, 441 the parties were divorced in Georgia in 1988.
The parties agreed that the husband would be the custodial parent of the
minor children. In 1989, the parties' son, by mutual consent, began to live
with the wife in Florida. In 1990, the wife filed an action, in Georgia, to
modify the custody of the son from the husband to her. When the case was
called for hearing, however, the wife did not appear. On the day the
Georgia case was to have been heard, the wife filed a modification
proceeding in Florida. The husband moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion over him, and the Florida court granted the motion but determined that
it would nevertheless proceed to adjudicate the custody issue at a future
date. Meanwhile, the Georgia court entered an order finding that it had
438. Id.
439. 601 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
440. Id.; accordSchilling v. Wood, 532 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988). But
see Waters v. Waters, 578 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a trial court
has "inherent jurisdiction" over minor children even when no underlying proceeding is
pending under either chapter 61 or chapter 39).
441. 592 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and adjudicated the wife
in contempt of court for wrongfully withholding the custody of the child
from the husband. The Florida court then determined that it had jurisdiction
and entered an order listing the reasons why the Florida court had "signifi-
cant connections" with the minor child. The First District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding: (1) only the court in the state where the initial custody
order was entered should evaluate the contacts between the child and the
states involved in determining whether the initial state should relinquish
jurisdiction; (2) modification petitions should be addressed to the court
which rendered the original decree even if a second state has become the
"home state" of the child in the intervening period of time; (3) a second
state may only exercise jurisdiction where the court of continuing jurisdic-
tion (the court where the original custody decree was entered) expressly
determines that its exercise of jurisdiction is no longer appropriate or where
virtually all contacts with the state of continuing jurisdiction have ceased;
(4) only when the child and all parties have moved away is the deference
to another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required.4 2
In Greenfield v. Greenfield,44 3 the Fourth District was presented with
the "reverse side" of Lamon v. Rewis, in which Florida was the state of
continuing jurisdiction. In Greenfield, the parties were divorced in Broward
County in 1982. Thereafter, in September of 1990, the Broward County
court entered an agreed order as to child support which also provided that
all other provisions of the final judgment (which included a retention of
jurisdiction) remained in full force and effect. In October, 1990, the wife
and minor child moved to Illinois. According to the wife, the move was
temporary: she maintained her driver's license, voter's registration and
vehicle registration in Florida and continued to own real property in Florida.
In January of 1991, the wife secured employment in Florida but delayed her
return until the child had finished the school year in Illinois. One month
after the wife and child left Illinois, the husband entered an ex parte motion
in Illinois for an order granting him temporary custody of the child. The
order was granted. The wife then sought relief in Florida, and in August of
1991, the husband removed the child from Florida and took her to Illinois.
Thereafter. the wife obtained, in Florida, a temporary order finding that
Florida had jurisdiction and ordered the husband to return the child to the
wife. The Florida trial judge then entered an order for communication
between the two courts and found that Florida was the child's "home state;"
442. Id. at 1224-25.
443. 599 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewdenied, 613 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992).
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had "significant connections" with the child; and Illinois had no significant
connections with the child. The district court affirmed the finding of
continuing jurisdiction in the State of Florida.444
The Fourth District also affirmed Florida's continuing jurisdiction in
Rothman v. Rothman.445 Therein, the parties' minor child travelled to
Georgia in July of 1990 for visitation with the husband. In August, 1990,
the Georgia court found the child to be "deprived" and ordered that the
temporary custody of the child be with his grandparents. The wife attended
the hearing in Georgia and consented to the child's placement with the
grandparents. For the next year the child lived with the grandparents and
then, in 1991, the Georgia court ordered the child placed in the custody of
the Department of Family and Children Services for eventual placement
with the husband. The Fourth District determined that the State of Florida
continued to have jurisdiction over the issue of the child's custody, holding
that Georgia had exercised only emergency jurisdiction and that such
emergency jurisdiction did not give the State of Georgia the authority to
render a final, permanent custody decision.446
Lastly, in McCabe v. McCabe,447 where throughout the parties'
marriage the husband had been in the military but retained his legal
residency in Florida, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court's finding ofjurisdiction based upon the husband's residency in Florida.
Instead of basing its jurisdiction upon the husband's legal residence in
Florida, the district court opined that the trial court should have inquired as
to whether Florida was the "home state" of the child or whether Florida had
significant connections with the child. Because the trial court did not do so,
the trial court failed to apply the proper standards to a determination of
jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A.448
D. Geographical Limitations and Relocation Cases
The most eagerly awaited decision rendered in marital and family law
within the past decade was the Florida Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Mize v. Mize,449 a decision which ended literally years of appellate court
conflict upon the issue of parental relocation.
444. Id. at 1030-31.
445. 599 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
446. Id. at 261.
447. 600 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
448. Id. at 1186.
449. 621 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1993).
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In Mize, the Florida Supreme Court adopted the approach enunciated
by the Third District Court of Appeal in Hill v. Hill,45° and held that as
long as a parent who has been granted the primary custody of the child
desires to move for a well-intentioned reason and founded belief that the
relocation is best for that parent's, and it follows, the child's well-being,
rather than from a vindictive desire to interfere with the visitation rights of
the other parent, the change in residence should ordinarily be approved.
The trial courts were directed to determine the following with respect to any
requested relocation: (1) whether the move would be likely to improve the
general quality of life for both the primary residential spouse and the
children; (2) whether the motive for seeking the move is for the express
purpose of defeating visitation; (3) whether the custodial parent, once out
of the jurisdiction, will be likely to comply with any substitute visitation
arrangements; (4) whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster
a continuing meaningful relationship between the child or children and the
non-custodial parent; (5) whether the cost of transportation is financially
affordable by one or both of the parents; and (6) whether the move is in the
best interests of the child.45'
XI. SPECIAL EQUITY
The question of what is a "special equity" and when a "special equity"
in property should be granted to a party in a dissolution of marriage action
continues to be an issue plaguing the trial courts. Within the past two years,
four decisions relative to "special equity" principles were rendered, three of
which reverse findings of "special equity" made by the trial court and one
of which contains a new statement of the law pertaining to "special equity."
In Glover v. Glover,452 the husband owned a home prior to the
parties' marriage but during the marriage transferred title to the home from
himself to he and the wife jointly. The trial court determined that the
husband had established a "special equity" in the home and the First District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that, pursuant to section 61.075 of the
Florida Statutes, the fact that property is titled in joint names raises a
presumption that such property is a marital asset. Accordingly, the party
450. 548 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 560 So. 2d 233 (Fla.
1990).
451. Id. at 706.
452. 6(01 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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seeking to establish otherwise has the burden to prove that a gift was not
intended when title was taken in joint names.453
The Third District held identically in Smith v. Smith,454 determining
that there is a presumption that jointly held property is marital property
regardless of who paid for it. Additionally, to establish a special equity the
party attempting to overcome the presumption must prove that a gift was not
intended when title was taken as tenants by the entireties.455
However, the Third District also announced in Smith a new statement
of the law of special equity, specifically, that the burden of establishing the
special equity is to prove same "beyond a reasonable doubt" and not merely
by clear and convincing evidence. This statement of the law marks the first
time that a traditionally criminal law standard of proof has been applied to
relief in a dissolution of marriage action.
XI. CONCLUSION
If one thing is clear from the family law decisions rendered during the
survey period, it is that significant questions remain to be decided by
Florida's appellate courts. Issues continue to arise which will need
resolution and the numerous conflicts between the appellate courts must be
resolved. However, the direction in which family law appears to be moving
is quite positive from both a social perspective and a legal perspective and
the trends evidenced in the recent decisional law give every indication that
such development will continue.
453. Id. at 233; see also Young v. Young, 606 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1992). In Young, the husband's mother conveyed the property's title to the husband and wife
jointly and the trial court awarded the husband a "special equity" therein. The district court
reversed, holding that the burden was upon the husband to establish that his mother had not
intended to convey the property as a gift to both the husband and the wife. Id.
454. 597 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
455. Id. at 371.
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